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INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, piracy has exploded off the coast of
Somalia. Somali pirates congregate on a "mother ship" and then
1
divide into smaller groups that sail out on tiny skiffs. Using potent
2
weapons such as AK-47s and hand-propelled grenades, Somali
pirates attack civilian ships carrying cargo through the Gulf of Aden,
a body of water between Yemen and Somalia. 3 Once they have
overtaken the victim vessel, the pirates typically hijack the vessel's
4
cargo and kidnap the crewmembers. The cargo is often resold to
5
willing buyers or held for ransom. The crew are kept hostage in
Somalia until either the hostages' home country or the shipowners
6
pay, at times, multi-million dollar ransoms.
In most instances,
7
crewmembers are released unharmed, but those held hostage have
8
described a horrific ordeal. The pirates themselves routinely go
unpunished: once they release the hostages, the pirates simply plan
yet another lucrative capture.
The reasons why Somali pirates have a high success rate are
relatively simple. First, Somali pirates operate mostly in the Gulf of

1. Todd Pitman, Ending Somali Piracy: Few Options for US Forces, ABC NEWS, Apr.
14, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Intemational/wireStory?id::73371l4.
2. Suspected Pirates Rescued in Gulf of Aden, CNN.COM, Dec. 5, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/12/04/yemen.pirates/index.html.
3. Id. The Gulf of Aden is a major international shipping route linking the Red
Sea and the Arabian Sea. Id.
4. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the
Coast ofSomalia, ASIL INSIGHTS, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm
(describing the pirates' typical operational style and goals).
5. Id.
6. See Vivienne Walt, Why the Somali Pirates Keep Getting Their Ransoms, TIME, Apr.
20,
2009,
http://www.time.com/time/worfd/article/0,8599,1892366,00.html
(indicating that container ships and tankers can command ransoms upwards of two
million dollars).
7. Pitman, supra note 1.
8. See, e.g., Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategi,c
Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3 (2007)
(describing the experience of a hijacked ship's crew with Somali pirates); Margaret
Ryan, Captain Counts the Cost ofPiracy, BBC NEWS, Feb. 2, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4669050.stm (describing an incident where
pirates set a ship's crew adrift at sea with few rations, and the crew was forced to
drink their own urine to survive).
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9

Aden, a major global shipping route, where the number of potential
targets is higher than elsewhere. Second, Somali pirates are able to
use the region's geography to their advantage. Somalia has the
longest coastline in Africa, making it difficult to patrol, and it is
populated by coastal towns where pirates easily blend in with other
10
insurgent groups. Because the Gulf of Aden is a relatively narrow
body of water, pirates are also able to bring smaller ships to land fairly
quickly, which allows them to secure the crew and cargo while they
wait for ransom. n Third, Somalia is a failed state with a weak,
unstable central government and no effective police force; thus,
pirates are able to operate with impunity from Somali coastal towns. 12
In fact, news accounts suggest that entire towns on the coast of
13
Somalia happily live off the proceeds of piracy. Fourth, piracy is a
lucrative business: reports indicate that a single seizure of a ship can
earn each individual pirate up to $150,000. 14 In Somalia, where yearly
earnings average about $600, this amount is staggering to Somali
15
youth who see few other employment options.
Finally, piracy in Somalia is thriving because of a lack of global
cooperation in suppressing pirate attacks.
Pirates work at a
supranational level: they attack a vessel owned by a company
headquartered in country A, which flies the flag of country B, and
employs crewmembers coming from countries C, D, E, and F. 16 Thus,
no single country's interests are harmed through the pirate attack.
9. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword, 25
WORLD PoL'Y J. 41, 41 (noting that 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden
annually and that their cargos include twelve percent of the world's daily oil supply).
10. Pitman, supra note 1.
11. Id.; see also Kontorovich, supra note 4.
12. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 52; Death Toll Rises as Violence Rocks Somali
Capital, CNN.COM, Mar. 11, 2010,
http:/ /www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/03/l l/somalia.fighting/index.html?ire
f=allsearch [hereinafter Death Toll Rises] (remarking that Somalia has not had a
stable government since 1991 and describing the ongoing fighting between
government and rebel forces); Pitman, supra note 1.
13. See Mohamed Ahmed, Pirate Stock Exchange Helps Fund Hijackings, FIN. POST
(Canada),
Dec.
1,
2009,
http://www.financialpost.com/news
sectors/story.html?id=2289558 (describing how the pirates have set up "maritime
companies"
in
some
coastal
villages).
In the exchange towns, local Somalis can invest in the piracy industry by contributing
money, weapons, or other materials to the pirates. Id. The investor then receives a
share of the ransom money from successful pirate ventures. Id.
14. Kontorovich, supra note 4.
15. Rukmini Callimachi, Seychelles Coast Guard Arrests 9 Suspected Pirates, ABC
NEWS,
Apr.
28,
2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wirestory?id=7446902&page=2.
16. See infra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing flags-of-convenience
and their effect on antipiracy efforts).
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Moreover, many crewmembers come from the developing world,
and major maritime powers such as the United States and the United
Kingdom have shown relatively little interest in ransoming pirate-held
18
hostages. The lack of global cooperation of law enforcement with
regard to Somali piracy, combined with the failure to prosecute
detained pirates, has significantly contributed to Somali pirates' high
success rates. Even shipping companies, despite being the entities
most directly affected by pirate attacks, have done little to solve the
issue. Instead, shipping companies have exacerbated the problem of
Somali piracy by paying increasingly high ransoms in exchange for
the release of hijacked ships, cargo, and kidnapped crewmembers. 19
This Article argues that the true solution to the Somali piracy
problem consists of a globally coordinated effort involving major
maritime powers, countries in the regions affected by piracy, and
shipping companies. This effort would encourage parties to share
information and jointly collect data, cooperate in maritime patrols
and surveillance operations off the Somali coast, establish
jurisdictional networks that ensure pirates are always prosecuted, and
provide stiff penalties for apprehended pirates. Part I of this Article
describes why fighting piracy is crucial in today's volatile world. It
argues that if Somali piracy continues to thrive, it could dangerously
undermine East African regional stability, contribute to the rise of
terrorism, further endanger the financial stability of the shipping
industry, and impose burdensome human and monetary costs on a
global scale. Even major maritime countries like the United States or
the United Kingdom could be seriously affected by unchecked piracy
in Somalia. Part II outlines the existing legal resources available to
fight piracy, including domestic criminal statutes and major
international treaties. Part III describes how other regions have
addressed the problem of modem piracy, focusing on the successful
solutions adopted by the littoral states in Southeast Asia when piracy
incidents increased in the Malacca Straits. Finally, Part IV presents
17. See, e.g., 14 Reasons: Why Ship Owners Prefer Filipino Seafarers and How They
Exploit Them, MARINEBUZZ.COM, Oct. 30, 2008,
http:/ /www.marinebuzz.com/2008/l 0/30I14-reasons-why-ship-owners-prefer
filipino-seafarers-and-how-they-exploit-them/ [hereinafter 14 Reasons] (describing
why many shipping companies hire crews out of the Philippines).
18. See Walt, supra note 6 (noting that governments usually do not pay ransoms to
pirates because (1) shipping or insurance companies will instead; and (2) paying
ransoms would undermine their anti-pirate military strategies).
19. James W. Carbin, Pirates: Hostis Humanis Generis, 56 FED. L. 50, 55 (2009)
(concluding that shipping companies' practice of paying ransoms encourages the
continuance of piracy).
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both legal and practical solutions based on the Southeast Asian
model that could be adopted to resolve the Somali piracy crisis. This
Article concludes that, because of the potential global threat that
Somali piracy poses, any response must be global in scope, with all
affected parties-private and governmental-working both to
improve security and law enforcement in the affected area and to
resolve jurisdictional conflicts that inhibit efforts to bring pirates to
justice.
I.

PRELUDE: WHY FIGHTING SOMALI PIRACY IS IMPORTANT

According to Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB), piracy in the Gulf of Aden is
"out of control." 20
In 2008, Somali pirates took nearly 600
crewmembers hostage; several hundred of these crewmembers, as
well as a dozen ships, are still being held by the pirates, who may
21
demand millions of dollars in ransom for their release.
Somali
pirates have become more aggressive in their operations, recently
beginning to attack larger ships. In 2008, they seized the Faina,
which was carrying Russian tanks and ammunition, as well as the
22
supertanker Sirius Star, which was carrying two million barrels of oil.
Section I.A will discuss how, if left unchecked, Somali piracy, in the
long-term, could eventually lead to the decline of commercial activity
23
and commercial centers in East Africa. Section LB will show how
Somali piracy imposes significant costs on shipping companies that
are already financially stressed, deterring maritime commerce,
endangering sea lines of transportation and communication, and
24
undermining regional stability.
In 2008, the United Nations Security Council, recognizing the
seriousness of the threat posed by Somali piracy, passed Resolution
1816, which states that piracy "exacerbate[s] the situation in
Somalia[,] which continues to constitute a threat to international
25
peace and security in the region."
Section I.C will discuss how
piracy can both contribute to the formation of maritime terrorism
20. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 42.
Id.
22. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy Repression, Partnering and the Law, 40 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 43, 43 (2009); see also Walt, supra note 6 (noting that pirates have
become increasingly skilled at hijacking and that kidnap experts were stunned at the
seizure of the Sirius Star, whose side had been regarded as too high for pirates to
scale).
23. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 43.
24. Id. at 42-43.
25. S.C. Res. 1816, 'I[ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 Uune 2, 2008).
21.
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and provide funding and other assistance to terrorist causes, aiding
groups such as al-Qaida. This section will also demonstrate how
allowing pirates to pursue their activities without resistance sends a
strong lack-of-deterrence message to other potential sea and land
based terrorists, who may infer that their efforts will remain
unchecked for many years as well.
A.

Piracy and the Failed Somali State: A Threat to Global Peace
26

Somalia is a failed state. Since the early 1990s, Somalia has not
had a stable government, and its fragile government is currently
battling warlords and militant Islamic groups for control of the
27
country. The country does not have a functional economy, and its
official law enforcement operations are slim, with gangs of
paramilitary groups and rebel forces controlling the streets of
28
Mogadishu and other towns.
Piracy has thrived in this cowboy
culture of inefficient government, and everyday life is ruled by
29
violence. A functional Somali government is so absent that some
Somali coastal towns have established pirate-centric societies where
piracy not only enjoys local support, but local governments rely on
30
it. If nothing is done to thwart the rise of piracy in Somalia, piracy
will not only continue to prosper in Somalia, undermining efforts to
stabilize the country, but also seriously threaten regional and
31
international peace and stability.
Piracy can spread elsewhere from Somalia. Other African states,
whether Somali neighbors or located farther away, could fall prey to
26. See id. at 52.
27. Kontorovich, supra note 4 (noting that Somalia has not had a stable
government since 1991 and lacks the capacity to keep its territorial waters secure); see
also Jane G. Dalton et al., Introductory Note to United Nations Security Council: Piracy and
Armed Robbery at Sea-Resolutions 1816, 1846 & 1851, 48 INT'L LEGAL MATTERS 129,
129 (2009) (attributing the rise in piracy in Somalia to "violent political and
economic instability, ... the lack of a viable infrastructure to counter lawlessness,
and the continued proliferation of ever-more-sophisticated small arms and light
weapons"); Death Toll Rises, supra note 12 (describing ongoing conflicts between the
government and a militant Islamic group, al-Shabaab).
28. See Ahmed, supra note 13 (describing the government's lack of control over
the country and the economic difficulties faced by Somalians); Bahar, supra note 8,
at 19 (noting that Somalia has no formal maritime defense forces and no effective
government).
29. Dalton et al., supra note 27, at 129.
30. Ahmed, supra note 13 (quoting a local Somali government official who stated
that "[p]iracy-related business is the main profitable economic activity in our area
and as locals we depend on their output"). The official described how local districts
are given a percentage of the pirates' ransom, which they then use to improve
infrastructure, such as hospitals and schools. Id.
31. See infra Part I. C (discussing the link between piracy and terrorism) .
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powerful pirate operations, especially if such operations become
firmly rooted in Somalia and ruled by powerful warlords enjoying
Somali government support. Regional pirate networks could be
created, posing a significant threat to global commerce and human
safety. 32 Moreover, piracy can endanger commercial and tourist
routes, undermining the regional economy and exposing
33
neighboring states to all sorts of potential problems.
Potential
problems include economic non-viability, political and civil unrest
caused by poverty, and border instability provoked by the need to
expend vast resources on the fight against piracy. In addition, Somali
piracy can threaten global peace and security if pirates start
collaborating with other maritime trafficking groups, such as those
who smuggle narcotics or weapons of mass destruction, either for a
financial or political cause. Thus, the development of Somali piracy
could contribute to the spread of maritime violence, endangering sea
routes everywhere and supporting dangerous factions across the
34
globe. As discussed below, the Somali pirates could become linked
to powerful terrorist organizations and could significantly contribute
to the development and growth of such groups. These global
implications, highlighted below, show why a present-day global
response is needed to curb and eventually eliminate this menace.
B.

The Economic Costs ofPiracy

As pirate attacks increased over the last few years in the Gulf of
Aden and elsewhere off the Somali coast, so did shipping companies'
cargo transportation costs for any ships sailing in these treacherous
waters. Estimates indicate that shipping companies may be losing
between thirteen and fifteen billion dollars per year due to pirate
35
attacks. To minimize the risk of ships falling prey to Somali pirates,
shipping companies have devoted significant attention to shipping
routes. In order to avoid the most dangerous places, routes have

32. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 43 (arguing that piracy could contribute
to regional instability in East Africa).
33. Id. ("Beyond the immediate threat to crews, property, and ships, maritime
piracy endangers sea lines of communication, interferes with freedom of navigation
and the free flow of commerce, and undermines regional stability.").
34. Reports indicate that Somali pirates have broadened the geographical scope
of their operations from the Gulf of Aden, close to the Somali shore, to Seychelles,
farther out in the Indian Ocean. Callimachi, supra note 15.
35. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 43.
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sometimes been recalculated and lengthened, thus requiring more
fuel and more paid days at sea for crewmembers. 36
Moreover, because of the increased risk of pirate attacks off the
Somali coast, insurance premiums have soared: whereas shippers
previously paid as little as $500 per voyage, they now face rates as high
as $20,000 for vessels passing through the pirate-infested waters. 37
Shipping companies' labor costs have also increased. In light of the
dangers of the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden, shippers have needed to
increase crewmembers' salaries to entice them to serve on vessels
38
deployed through these waters.
Even with higher salaries, some
crewmembers may simply be unwilling to expose their own lives to
39
the dangers posed by piracy.
Thus, recruiting for shipping
companies may become a difficult exercise, requiring additional
efforts and expenses. 40
Finally, in addition to increasing costs on the front-end of the
shipping process, piracy has driven up costs in other ways. In some
cases, pirates have demanded multi-million dollar ransoms after
successfully hijacking a ship and kidnapping its crewmembers, and
the shipping companies have met those demands in almost every
41
instance by paying large sums of cash to the pirates. These pirate
imposed costs have substantially increased shipping companies'

36. Id. at 42 (indicating that rerouting ships to avoid the Suez Canal and instead
sail around the Cape of Good Hope would add an additional two weeks to the sea
voyage, increasing the cost of shipping and the time of transit significantly).
37. Id. at 43.
38. Reports indicate that some crewmembers are asking for double pay when
sailing through pirate-infested waters. The Price of Piracy on Shipping, MARKETPLACE,
Apr.
10.
2009,
http:/ I marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/04/10/ pm_piracy; see also
14 Reasons, supra note 17 (remarking that shipowners compensate many Filipino
crewmembers with double pay for the risk of sailing through the Gulf of Aden).
39. Dan Horlock, Outlook '09: Chemical Shipping Faces Stormy Waters, ICIS.COM,Jan.
7, 2009, http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/01/07/9182084/outlook--09-chemical
shipping-faces-stormy-waters.html (discussing how piracy has exacerbated the pre
existing problem of qualified crew shortages in certain areas of the shipping
industry).
40. Baird Maritime, InterManager: Criminalisation and Piracy Damage Seafarer
Recruitment, Mar. 22, 2010,
http:/ /www.bairdmaritime.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6
004:intermanager-criminalisation-and-piracy-damage-seafarer
recrui tmen t&catid= l l 3:ports-and-shipping&Itemid=208.
41. Carbin, supra note 19, at 54 (speculating that ransoms paid to date will soon
reach the amount of $50 million dollars). One reason the pirates have been so
successful at obtaining large ransom payments is that the pirates have been careful
not to damage hijacked vessels and cargo or to injure hostages so that they can use
these assets as leverage. Id.
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expenses and could cause significant long-term economic problems
42
in the shipping industry if piracy in Somalia is not addressed.
The financial problems that Somali pirates have brought upon
shipping companies are particularly relevant in light of the ongoing
global financial crisis. 43
According to one recent analysis,
"[i]nstability from maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden is sending
ripples throughout the global supply chain, which is already reeling
from the collapse of shipping rates brought on by the worldwide
economic slowdown. "44
As the economic crisis has peaked,
consumption has declined, demand for merchandise and raw
materials has dropped, and fewer ships are needed to transport
goods. The result has been a decrease in shipping prices and lower
45
profits for shipping companies.
Moreover, shipping companies'
abilities to borrow money and work closely with large lenders may
46
have been negatively affected by the banking crisis.
A significant
decline in existing cash flows coupled with the need to expend large
sums of cash to pay pirate ransoms may wreak havoc on shipping
companies' finances and may threaten their long-term financial
stability. In addition, the financial strain of increasing global fuel
costs is exacerbated by the need to purchase additional fuel to avoid
47
pirate-infested shipping routes. Finally, if shipping companies are
forced to incur additional expenses to equip their ships with security
officers, weapons, pirate-tracking devices, and other technological
mechanisms to combat pirates, their financial future and well-being
in today's volatile economy may become uncertain.

42. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 46 (explaining that, in addition to pirate
imposed costs and safety concerns, the shipping industry also faces unpredictable
fuel costs, skyrocketing insurance premiums, decreasing freight rates, and increasing
safety concerns for crew and cargo).
43. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 41.
44. Id.
45. See Thomas Shulz, That Sinking Feeling: Global Crisis Hits Shipping Industry
Hard, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Dec. 5, 2008,
http:/ /www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,594710,00.html.
46. Id. (describing how banks' reluctance to issue loans and letters of credit is
impacting shipping companies); Alexander Jung et al., The Container Crisis: Shipping
Industry Fights for Survival, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Aug. 11, 2009,
http:/ /www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,641513,00.html (noting that
the shipping industry declined by sixteen percent in six months).
47. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 43.
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Piracy as Terrorism: The "Piratization ofTerrorism"

Some modern-day pirates, including some operating in Somalia,
are more akin to sea-terrorists than sea-robbers. While contemporary
pirate activity, like medieval piracy, may be fueled partially by the
prospect of significant financial gain, some modern pirates resort to
49
violence because of political and ideological goals.
1.

Pirates' political aims
During the 1990s and early 2000s, when piracy was thriving in the
Malacca Straits of Southeast Asia, reports indicated that pirates
operated off an Indonesian island where the Aceh separatist group
50
was fighting for autonomy and independence from Indonesia.
Some pirates were members of Aceh, while others received support
from Aceh. It is widely believed that piracy proceeds fueled the Aceh
separatist movement by providing the group with the funds necessary
to purchase weapons, train military groups, and engage in violent
secessionist combat. 51 Southeast Asia is also home to other violent
Islamic groups, such as the Jemaah Islamiya and the Mumpulan
Mujahideen in Malaysia; the Moro National Liberation Front, the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines;
52
and Laskar Jihad in Indonesia.
Some of these groups have
53
considered launching attacks against vessels in the Strait of Malacca.
Others have already launched attacks: the Indonesian Aceh rebels
hijacked an oil tanker in 2003; Abu Sayyaf has abducted foreigners
from resorts by boat, transporting them to the Philippines where they
then demand multi-million dollar ransoms; and ethnic Malay groups
have become increasingly interested in learning hijacking
54
techniques.
In sum, IMB has reported the emergence of a "new
brand of piracy" in Southeast Asia, one where attacks are motivated
by overarching political goals and where ransoms are used to finance

48. I respectfully borrow the term "piratization of terrorism" from Michael
Bahar. See Bahar, supra note 8, at 28.
49. Erik Barrios, Note, Casting a Wider Net: Addressing the Maritime Piracy Prob"fem in
Southeast Asia, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 149, 151 (2005).
50. Bahar, supra note 8, at 29 (describing how the Free Aceh Movement in
Indonesia has been linked to maritime terrorism).
51. See Id. (describing pirate attacks committed by the Free Aceh Movement in
the Strait of Malacca between 2002 and 2003); see al,so Aceh Rebel,s Blamed for Piracy,
BBC, Sept. 8, 2003, http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3090136.stm.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Niclas Dahlvang, Thieves, Robbers, & Terrorists: Piracy in the 21st Century, 4
REGENT]. INT'L L. 17, 33-34 (2006).
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politically related terrorist activity rather than to provide personal
55
financial gain.
There is also some concern that terrorist groups could engage in
pirate-like hijackings to carry out terror attacks. One author notes:
Actual attacks by terrorists have thus far been limited to temporary
seizures of vessels and crewmen, but officials express concern over
the ease with which large vessels such as oil tankers could be
hijacked and used as weapons with which to block commercial
waterways or attack one of Southeast Asia's numerous busy harbors.
In addition to direct attacks, terrorists may also exploit the region's
maritime shipping activity to facilitate their operations in other
parts of the world. For example, authorities suspect that terrorist
groups have been using container ships to smuggle weapons,
56
supplies, and even the terrorists themselves.

Somalia provides fertile ground for piracy and terrorism to merge.

2.

Somali piracy and terrorism
The "piratization of terrorism," which is already a significant worry
in Southeast Asia, could easily spread to Somalia, where Osama bin
Laden is believed to have militant training bases, and where militant
57
factions linked to al-Qaida operate freely. Terrorism already has a
foothold in the country; for example, authorities believe that a
militant Islamist rebel group carried out a recent terrorist attack that
left twenty-three people dead at a medical school graduation in
58
Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. This type of violence exemplifies
Somalia's volatility, vulnerability to militant Islamic groups, and the
ability of terrorist groups to function with impunity. Similarly, pirates
have been able to operate without repercussions. If not kept in
check, Somali pirates could forge allegiances with terrorist groups
interested in attacking in Somalia or elsewhere in the world.
Outside Somalia, some modern-day pirate organizations are akin to
59
sea-terrorists because they have direct ties to terrorist groups.
Pirates have smuggled weapons and delivered them to terrorist

55. Barrios, supra note 49, at 151.
56. Id. (citations omitted).
57. Bahar, supra note 8, at 28; Death Toll Rises, supra note 13 (linking a local
militant Islamic group, al-Shabaab, to al-Qaida).
58. Somalia Graduation Ceremony Blast Kills 23, CNN.COM, Dec. 4, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/12/04/somalia.attacks/index.html
(reporting that the attack was attributed to al-Shabaab).
59. See, e.g., Dahlvang, supra note 54, at 18 (arguing that the profits realized by
piracy may subsidize terrorism).
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groups 60 and have financially contributed to such groups. Modern
pirates are not sympathetic Robin Hoods of the sea; rather, they are
maritime terrorists linked to powerful groups like al-Qaida and the
Aceh, engaged in a form of sea aggression to terrorize shippers and
govemments. 62 Al-Qaida, for example, has used vessels filled with
explosives to attack ships from major maritime powers, such as the
United States and France. 63 Osama bin Laden, who allegedly owns or
controls almost twenty freighters known as the "al Qaeda Navy," has
shown how terrorists can utilize the seas: a bin Laden-controlled
merchant ship delivered the explosives that were used to bomb
64
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.
Modern pirates are also similar to terrorists because they function
on a highly organized scale at a supranational level. The Southeast
Asian pirates have not confined their attacks to ships from their
countries of residence; rather, they have targeted cargo ships from a
variety of nations, taken hostage nationals of many different states,
65
and demanded ransom from all of these governments.
Similarly,
Somali pirates have engaged in indiscriminate attacks against a
variety of nations' ships, likewise taking hostages from numerous
66
countries and demanding ransoms from their governments.
Moreover, modem pirates function in a hierarchical, organized
fashion. Reports on Somali piracy indicate that their operations are
managed by powerful warlords who live in impunity on the Somali
mainland; the attacks are executed by young men who are recruited
from the poverty-stricken streets in coastal villages and towns. 67
Similarly, powerful leaders, like Osama bin Laden, lead terrorist
organizations, often hiding in lawless regions or geographically
60. Id. at 31-32 (describing how terrorist organizations use ships flying flags-of
convenience to transport weapons and explosives, some of which have been linked to
terrorist attacks such as the Bali nightclub bombings of 2002).
61. Id. at 31-34 (detailing instances of pirate attacks linked to terrorist groups
and pointing out that piracy can be used to fund terrorism).
62. Dahlvang, supra note 54, at 31-32, 34 (describing Osama bin Laden's "navy"
and a 2003 oil tanker hijacking linked to Aceh).
63. See George D. Gabel, Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as an
International Solution to Modem-Day Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1433, 1437-38 (2007)
(describing al-Qaida attacks on a U.S. ship in 2000 and on a French ship in 2002).
64. Id. at 1438.
65. See, e.g., Dahlvang, supra note 54, at 31-34 (detailing instances of pirate
attacks in Southeast Asia against ships coming from different nations).
66. Bahar, supra note 8, at 36.
67. When ten suspected Somali pirates were apprehended after the attack on the
Safina al Bisrat in 2006, it was discovered that they did not know their birthdays, their
parents, or how to read and write, and some were very young. Id. at 41; see also
Ahmed, supra note 13 (providing a specific example of how Somalia's impoverished
state drove a young man to piracy).
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inhospitable areas, while terrorist attacks are virtually always executed
by young men recruited by the terrorist group in a systematic,
68
In addition, both modern-day pirates
carefully planned manner.
and terrorist groups may bribe government officials to gain valuable
69
information, which they use to prepare attacks.

3.

Piracy as terrorism in international conventions
Some scholars support the view that the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), negotiated in 1982,
70
embraces acts commonly considered terrorism as piracy. UNCLOS
71
defines piracy as a violent act committed "for private aims." Other
scholars argue that this provision simply excludes state-sponsored
piracy from the convention and does not eliminate acts committed
for a political purpose (such as the acts of a terrorist group) from
12
qualifying as piracy.
In other words, just because terrorists have
some political goals, their actions also consist of at least some private
ends that would bring maritime terrorists within the definition of
piracy under UNCLOS. 73 Moreover, as long as maritime terrorists
attack indiscriminately against several states, they remain hostis
74
humani generi and should be treated as pirates under UNCLOS.
Although many scholars contend that acts of terrorism do not qualify
as piracy under UNCLOS because they are not committed for private
but rather for political aims, recent scholarly support exists for the

68. See generally Thomas M. Sanderson, Transnational Terror and Organized Crime:
Blurring the Lines, 24 SAIS REV. 49 (2004) (analyzing the relationship between
organized crime and terrorism).
69. See Scott Baldauf, Who are Somalia's Pirates?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov.
20, 2008 http:/ /www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2008/l 120/p25s22-woaf.html
(discussing how corrupt government officials aid Somali pirates); David M. Luna,
Dir. for Anticrime Programs, Bureau of Int'! Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
Remarks at APEC Anticorruption Meeting (Feb. 26, 2009) (discussing how
corruption contributes to the success of international criminal organizations).
70. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Oct. 7, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 41-42 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (including "acts of violence" and
"detention" in the definition of piracy); Bahar, supra note 8, at 34-37 (demonstrating
through analysis of various acts of terrorism on vessels that the private ends sought by
the terrorists do not prevent these acts from being classified and prosecuted as
piracy).
71. UNCLOS, supra note 70; see also infra Part II.B (discussing the private aims
requirement under UNCLOS).
72. See Bahar, supra note 8, at 28-35 (arguing that as long as terrorists are not
direct state actors and they strike in international waters, they should be viewed as
pirates, regardless of their subjective intent).
73. Id. at 33.
74. Id.
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alternative proposition-that maritime terrorism represents a form of
75
piracy under UNCLOS.
The Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)-negotiated in
1988 in direct response to a maritime hijacking of an Italian cruise
ship by members of a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
faction-is an anti-terrorist convention listed as such on the United
76
Nations website and drafted as such for jurisdictional purposes. The
PLO attack epitomized the concept of piracy as maritime terrorism
77
after the United States decried the act as piracy.
The SUA
Convention solidifies the idea of universal jurisdiction by authorizing
any nation to pursue an attacking vessel, as long as the vessel is in
78
some form of international transit, and to prosecute offenders.
Finally, the SUA Convention, although applicable to most modern
day incidents of piracy, does not speak directly of piracy. Rather, it
simply outlaws several different types of maritime aggression, for
example: hijacking a ship, taking crew members or passengers
79
hostage, or planting explosives on a ship.
The SUA Convention
illustrates the modern-day approach to piracy and the need to
broaden its definition to encompass maritime aggression and
terrorism, as opposed to confining its definition to the out-dated
scope of sea-robbery.

75. For the traditional view that UNCLOS excludes acts of terrorism from its
definition of piracy, see Barrios, supra note 49, at 156; Tina Garmon, International
Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th,
27 TUL. MAR. LJ. 257, 274 (2002); Zou Keyuan, Implementing the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and Trends, 9 SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 37,
44 (2005). For the modem view that UNCLOS does not exclude acts of terrorism
from iL~ definition of piracy, see Bahar, supra note 8, at 27-28; Malvina Halberstam,
Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention of Maritime
Safety,
82 AM.J. INT'LL. 269, 282 (1988).
76. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation art. 3, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinanfter SUA
Convention] (defining the "offense" as a number of different acts that could be
terrorism or piracy, and not limiting the offense to the customary definition of
piracy); Malvina Halberstam, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Comments at the
American Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Mar. 26, 2009) [hereinafter
ASIL Meeting] (describing the events leading up to the passage of the SUA
Convention and how the SUA Convention addressed the antiterrorism concerns
posed by the Achille Lauro incident).
77. Bahar, supra note 8, at 27-28.
78. SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 3.
79. Id.
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D. Piracy and Deterrence
Piracy is a serious criminal activity. Pirates are criminal offenders
80
subject to universal jurisdiction; from a deterrence standpoint, not
fighting them sends the wrong message to pirates and other criminal
and terrorist organizations. This is particularly true if pirates are
routinely released after capture, or if only a few of those captured are
prosecuted. While deterrence is essential in the fight against piracy,
it is difficult to judge how efficacious prosecutions would be to deter
the spread of Somali piracy. Young men living in poverty on the
Somali coast may not be deterred at all by the possibility of facing
legal consequences when considering whether to become a pirate.
For poor Somali youth, the prospect of earning thousands of dollars
81
may outweigh the unlikely possibility of being caught and tried.
While deterrence alone may not solve the Somali pirate problem, it
remains an important part of the solution.
Deterrence of Somali pirates through criminal prosecutions
remains important for several reasons.
From a local Somali
standpoint, if prospective pirates believe the chances of capture and
prosecution significantly outweigh the probability of profit, then
there is a possibility that more recruits would be dissuaded from
82
engaging in this criminal activity.
Moreover, if international
criminals such as pirates are not routinely prosecuted and punished,
other potential criminals, such as weapons-smugglers and narco
traffickers, may think that hard-to-prosecute crimes routinely go
83
unpunished and that they may flout international law with impunity.
This may lead to an overall increase in international crime. Thus,
pirates should be fought, captured, and routinely prosecuted because
the whole world has an interest in deterring international crimes.
II. EXISTING LAWS AVAILABLE TO FIGHT PIRACY

While the previous section showed why prosecuting pirates is
necessary, this section will argue that the fight against piracy needs to

80. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 101.
81. See Bahar, supra note 8, at 41 (illustrating the dire circumstances under which
the Somali pirates have matured).
82. See id. (arguing that the perceived probability of capture will likely have a
deterrent effect on the Somali pirates).
83. See MICHAEL BRAUN, WASH. INSTIT. FOR NEAR E. POLICY, COUNTERING
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: TERRORISM, NARCO-TRAFFICKING, AND WMD PROLIFERATION
(POLICY Focus No. 92) 27, 27-29 (Mathew Levitt & Michael Jacobson eds., 2009)
(highlighting the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and terrorist
organizations and narco-trafficking and arms dealing).
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be grounded in the law: states active in fighting pirates and
interested in prosecuting them in domestic courts need to rely on
domestic and international laws in order to justify antipiracy
operations. 84 The section below outlines the domestic antipiracy laws
of some of the most important countries in the global piracy fight, as
well as the most important international laws and regulations
applicable to piracy.

A. Domestic Laws
The United States has a long history of punishing acts of piracy,
but in some respects it has failed to modernize its piracy law. The
U.S. Constitution defines piracy as an act that occurs on the high
85
seas. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the
power "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
86
the high seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations." Congress,
pursuant to such direct constitutional authority, enacted 18 U.S.C. §
1651, which provides that "[w]hoever, on the high seas, commits the
crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards
brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for
87
life."
The U.S. Supreme Court has further expounded the
definition of piracy, specifying that an act can come within the scope
of piracy even though the actors did not intend to plunder, or did
88
not engage in plunder.
According to the Supreme Court, if
someone "sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without any
other object than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief," the act
89
may qualify as piracy, like an act of robbery on the high seas. In the
United States, however, maritime law fails to address modern-day
issues of piracy, such as when acts are committed for a political end
90
or in support of terrorism.
In the Marine Insurance Act of 1906, Great Britain defined pirates
as "passengers who mutiny and rioters who attack the ship from the
91
shore." Prior to this, British common law viewed piracy as acts of
depredation and robbery committed on the high seas, which, if
84. See Bahar, supra note 8, at 40-43.
85. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.
86. Id.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006); see also id.§§ 1652-1653 (prescribing life sentences
for pirates who are aliens and United States citizens); 33 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (2006)
(authorizing the use of private and public vessels to combat and seize pirate ships).
88. United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844).
89. Id.
90. Gabel, supra note 63, at 1444.
91. Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 30, sched. 1, 11 8.
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committed on land, would have amounted to a felony.
Kenya, a
regional partner in the fight against Somali piracy, adapted its law
from British common law and has already tried some of the captured
93
Somali pirates.
Kenya defined a pirate as "[a]ny person who, in
territorial waters or upon the high seas, commits any act of piracy
•
••
,,94
JUre gentnum.
Southeast Asian countries have also struggled with finding a
suitable definition of the act of piracy. The Philippines, an important
partner in the fight against Southeast Asian piracy, defines the activity
as "[a]ny attack upon a seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the
whole or part thereof. . . by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any
person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said
95
vessel, in Philippine waters."
Malaysia, another country battling
Southeast Asian piracy, defines piracy as an act committed "by any
person on the high seas where the offense is piracy by the law of
96
nations."
The High Court of Malaysia has jurisdiction to try all
offenses that are committed within its own jurisdiction, onboard a
Malaysia-flagged vessel on the high seas, or by any Malaysia citizen or
97
resident on the high seas.
It is interesting to note the discrepancy in the definitions of piracy
in the above domestic laws. In the United States, Great Britain, and
Malaysia, an act must be committed on the high seas in order to
qualify as piracy; in Kenya, a prosecutable act of piracy can be
98
committed either in territorial waters or on the high seas; and in the
Philippines, the piratical act must be committed in Philippine waters
in order to constitute piracy. 99 Moreover, the laws of the United
States, Kenya, and Malaysia define piracy by referring to the law of
nations: under these countries' domestic laws, an act must constitute
piracy under international law first to be criminalized as piracy under

92. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 499 (John Bethune Bayly, ed.,
Saunders and Benning 1840).
93. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 46; see also Lawrence Azubuike, International
Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 43, 55 (2009).
94. The Penal Code, (1967) Cap. 63 § 69 (Kenya).
95. Antipiracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law ofl974, Pres. Dec. No. 532, § 2(d)
(1974),
(Phil.),
availabk
at
http://www.asianlii.org/ph/legis/pres_decree/pdn532181/.
96. Courts ofJudicature Act, (1964) § 22(l)(a)(iv) (Malay.).
97. Id.
98. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 87-97 (listing the different statutory
requirements for piracy in different countries that have dealt with piracy).
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100

The piracy laws of Great Britain and the Philippines,
domestic law.
however, do not contain any such references to the law of nations. 101
Thus, an additional hurdle in the global fight against piracy may be
found in the dissimilarities among the various countries' definitions
of piracy. For example, an act committed on the high seas may
qualify as piracy for most countries, but if the offenders or victims are
from the Philippines and if the Philippines are viewed as a logical
prosecution forum for that reason, the offenders may not be
prosecuted at all because the act was not committed in the Philippine
territorial waters. 102 Nations who captured the offenders may not be
able to transfer them to the Philippines for prosecution and may
simply have to release captured pirates for a lack of another option. 103
While the discrepancies among maritime nations' piracy laws are
important, and may sometimes impede the fight against piracy, piracy
is also the subject of several international treaties and regulations that
offer a more uniform definition than the domestic laws. These
treaties and regulations will be addressed in the following section.
B.

International Treaties and Reg;ulations ofPiracy

Article 15 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas (Convention
101
on the High Seas) and Article 101 of UNCLOS both contain the
most universally accepted definition of piracy:
(1) Any illegal act of violence, detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a
private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (a) On the high
seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property
on board such ship or aircraft; (b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons
100
or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.

100. See supra text accompanying notes 87-97 (highlighting the similarities in
antipiracy Jaws in the United States, Kenya, and Malaysia).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 87-97 (differentiating the piracy laws of
Great Britain and the Philippines from the applicable statutory requirements in
other countries).
102. See Azubuike, supra note 94, at 50 (limiting universal jurisdiction to
international waters more than twelve nautical miles off the coast of the country).
103. SeeAntipiracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, Pres. Dec. No. 532, §
2(d)
(1974),
(Phil.),
available
at
http:/ /www.asianlii.org/ph/legis/pres_decree/pdn532181/ (limiting the definition
of piracy to events that take place in Philippine waters, and not authorizing
prosecution for criminals caught on the high seas).
104. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 101; United Nations Convention on the High
Seas art. 15, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11, 90 [hereinafter Convention on the High
Seas].
105. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 101; Convention on the High Seas, supra note
104, art. 15.

2010]

THE SOMALI PIRACY PROBLEM

1467

While some scholars have criticized the restrictive nature of the
piracy definition in the Convention on the High Seas and UNCLOS,
arguing that the two treaties actually narrowed the scope of piracy
106
from its roots in customary law,
most agree that the above
107
definition reflects international custom as it stands today.
The Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS definition of piracy is
restrictive for several reasons. First, the definition requires that the
violent act be committed for private aims. 108 Although some scholars
believe that the private aims requirement is intended to eliminate
conduct committed on behalf of states or by state actors from the
109
definition of piracy, other scholars argue that this requirement
disqualifies acts committed for political and ideological reasons from
110
being considered piracy.
These scholars suggest that an act of
maritime terrorism committed to advance the political goals of a
group, like al-Qaida or the PLO, may not qualify as piracy under the
111
Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS definition.
Second, the
above piracy definition requires that the violent act be committed on
the high seas. 112 The reasons for this limitation are logical: under
traditional international law, anything that happens within the
territorial sovereignl)'. of a given state is a matter for that state alone
113
to address and rectify.
Because the crime of piracy is closely linked
106. See, e.g., Barrios, supra note 49, at 161 (arguing that under customary
international law, piracy was more broadly defined than the narrow definition
enshrined in UNCLOS).
107. Jon D. Peppetti, Building the Global Maritime Security Network: A Multinational
Legal Structure to Combat Transnational Threats, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 73, 92 (2008).
108. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 101; Convention on the High Seas, supra note
104, art. 15.
109. See, e.g., Bahar, supra note 8, at 27 ("Unless ... terrorists were commissioned
by a state, they are private actors."); see also id. at 27-37 (discussing in detail why acts
committed by terrorists can qualify as piracy).
110. Peppetti, supra note 107, at 92 (arguing that the private ends restriction has
contributed to the most commonly adopted view that acts of violence committed for
religious, ethnic, or political reasons, such as acts of maritime terrorism, cannot be
treated as piracy); see also supra Part I.C (utilizing the piracy issues in the Malacca
Straits of Indonesia, and other areas to explain the "piratization of terrorism" and
how the international community is attempting to fight this form of globalized,
politicized crime).
111. Azubuike, supra note 94, at 52 (noting that the commonly held view is that
acts of violence committed on religious, ethnic, or political grounds cannot be
treated as piracy).
112. Under UNCLOS, the area comprised of twelve miles into the sea from the
coastline of the littoral state constitutes the littoral state's territorial waters; any areas
beyond the territorial waters are considered part of the high seas. UNCLOS, supra
note 70, art. 3; see also Azubuike, supra note 93, at 50 (articulating the 12 nautical
mile requirements of UNCLOS and noting that up to 200 nautical miles may be
claimed by the mainland country as an economic zone).
113. Bahar, supra note 8, at 18.
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to the idea of universal jurisdiction, if the scope of piracy extends
into a state's territorial waters, the universality of the crime collides
with the territorial sovereignty of that state. 114 Therefore, the high
seas requirement for piracy is rational from an international law
. 115
stan d pomt.
While this may be true, the high seas requirement nonetheless
disqualifies many acts of maritime violence from the definition of
piracy. For example, if Somali pirates strike within the twelve
nautical-mile territorial sea of their home country, this act would not
constitute piracy under the Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS
definition. 116
Consequently, the Convention on the High
Seas/UNCLOS jurisdictional regimes, which provide any nation
interested in capturing pirates with the possibility of extending
universal jurisdiction over such captured pirates, are not useful in the
Somali context.
Another limiting factor is that the Convention on the High
Seas/UNCLOS piracy definition requires the presence of two vessels
for an act to qualify as piracy-an aggressor vessel must attack a
victim vessel. Therefore, if hijackers board the victim vessel at its last
port of entry and then overpower the ship's crew on the high seas,
this act would not constitute piracy under the Convention on the
117
High Seas/UNCLOS definition, because only one vessel is involved.
While some scholars have argued that two vessels may not be
required under the Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS
118
definition,
the majority view and the plain reading of these
conventions indicate that their drafters envision the presence of two
vessels in their definition of piracy. 119 Overall, the Convention on the
High Seas and UNCLOS codify the law of piracy narrowly, perhaps
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Peppetti, supra note 107, at 92-93.
117. Halberstam, supra note 76 (reasoning that universal jurisdiction on the high
seas makes sense because the coastal state only has an interest in protecting its home
waters).
118. See Bahar, supra note 8, at 38-39 (arguing that UNCLOS drafters merely
intended to exclude from the definition of piracy "criminal acts by one passenger or
crewmember against another" and also arguing that case law on piracy does not
support a two-ship requirement).
119. See, e.g., Azubuike, supra note 93, at 53 (explaining that the two-ship
requirement is reasonable because it "emanates from the notion that a ship [being
attacked] is always under the jurisdiction of the flag State," so that "any act or offense
committed on board [that] ship is subject to the domestic laws of the flag State"); see
also UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 101 (providing that piracy consists of violent acts
committed "by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft"
directed "against another ship or aircraft") (emphasis added).
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regrettably eliminating a multitude of acts of maritime aggression
from the definition of piracy.
In addition to limiting the definition of piracy, the Convention on
the High Seas and UNCLOS impose restrictions on states' ability to
capture and prosecute pirates. The conventions provide that any
state has jurisdiction to capture pirates on the high seas, as follows:
"On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of
any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship
taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the
120
persons and seize the property on board." The concept of universal
jurisdiction over pirates is limited to the high seas, as these
conventions do not authorize nations to pursue pirates in a state's
territorial waters. 121
These conventions further state that the capturing nation may then
prosecute pirates in its domestic courts. Article 19 of the Convention
on the High Seas and Article 105 of UNCLOS provide: "The courts
of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the
penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be
taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the
rights of third parties acting in good faith." 122
Under these
conventions, however, the capturing nation may not transfer seized
123
pirates to a third country for prosecution.
The idea of universal
jurisdiction, therefore, gives limited options to piracy-fighting states,
as their authority to pursue pirates ceases to exist outside the high
seas, and the opportunity to prosecute pirates arises only in cases
where the capturing state is also willing to prosecute. 124

120. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 105; Convention on the High Seas, supra note
104, art. 19.
121. UNCLOS defines the limit of territorial sea to twelve nautical miles offshore.
UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 3. Some nations, however, have taken a more
aggressive approach in claiming that their exclusive economic zones, which typically
extend out to 200 nautical miles, constitute territorial waters. See Dahlvang, supra
note 54, at 24 (explaining that China claims 200 nautical miles off its coast as the
area where the mainland has jurisdiction).
122. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 105; Convention on the High Seas, supra note
104, art. 19.
123. This conclusion follows from a close reading of the Convention on the High
Seas and UNCLOS, and many scholars have embraced it. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra
note 4 (relating the history of article 105 of UNCLOS, which does not allow a
transfer of captured pirates to third parties for prosecution, and comparing that
provision to the SUA Convention).
124. Note, however, that some scholars have argued that the Convention on the
High Seas and UNCLOS do not prohibit a noncapturing state from prosecuting
seized pirates. See, e.g., Azubuike, supra note 93, at 54-55 (arguing that the
jurisdiction of the capturing state is not exclusive but merely permissive because
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If an act of maritime violence does not fall within the scope of the
Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS, the perpetrators cannot be
apprehended or prosecuted under these conventions' jurisdictional
basis.
Consequently, countries willing to capture, detain, and
prosecute violent maritime offenders may be forced to look to other
laws in order to justify their anti-piracy operations.
Whereas the Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS provisions
sometimes leave gaps with regard to the capture and prosecution of
pirates, the SUA Convention attempts to aid states in their fight
against maritime violence by broadening the jurisdictional basis for
125
the capture and prosecution of maritime aggressors.
The SUA
Convention is considered an anti-terrorist treaty, and rather than
defining piracy, it lists a series of maritime criminal offenses that are
126
prohibited under the convention.
The list includes the following
acts that, if committed, would likely endanger the safe navigation of
the vessel: seizing or taking control of a ship by force or the threat of
force, performing an act of violence against a person on board a ship,
destroying or damaging a ship or its cargo, placing devices or
substances on a ship that are likely to destroy that ship, knowingly
communicating false information to a ship, and injuring or killing
127
any person in connection with any of the above acts.
The SUA Convention does away with the restrictive elements of the
Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS definition of piracy. First,
the SUA Convention does not have the private aims requirement of
the Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS treaties; thus, maritime
terrorist acts driven by politics and ideology, and not simply private
128
aims, would fall within the SUA Convention framework.
Second,
the SUA Convention authorizes states to pursue maritime aggressors
not only on the high seas, but anytime the victim vessel is in some

customary law provided for universal jurisdiction over pirates and UNCLOS codified
customary law).
125. SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 4.
126. Ratifying nations consider the SUA convention to be an antiterrorist
convention. Bob Beckman, Comments at the American Society of International Law
Annual Meeting (Mar. 26, 2009); see also Dahlvang, supra note 54, at 23 (noting that
the SUA Convention does not refer to piracy by name).
127. SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 4.
128. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 4 (noting the unique position and the broad
scope the SUA Convention has in relation to customary international law); see also
SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 3 (describing various acts as piracy without the
personal aims limitation).
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129

form of international transit.
Third, the SUA Convention no
longer requires the presence of two vessels; if hijackers board the ship
when it is docked and overwhelm its crew and passengers at a later
point in time, this act would fall within the SUA Convention
130
definitional framework.
Moreover, the SUA Convention affords
states more liberty in their attempts to prosecute aggressors. States
under the SUA Convention framework may capture aggressors
anywhere, and capturing states may transfer pirates to a third state for
•
131
prosecut10n purposes.
While the SUA Convention attempts to eliminate the restrictive
elements of the Convention on the High Seas/UNCLOS definition of
piracy, the former has not been as widely ratified and is not generally
132
considered a part of customary international law.
Regrettably, a
number of the countries most affected by piracy, such as Indonesia,
133
Malaysia, and Somalia, have not ratified the SUA Convention.
Thus, the SUA Convention may theoretically represent an attractive
option for piracy-fighting countries, but its practical reach may prove
134
limited because of its lack of universal acceptance and ratification.
After a significant increase in pirate attacks in the early 1990s,
several organizations developed additional regulations aimed at
combating piracy.
The International Maritime Organization's
129. SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 4; see also Peppetti, supra note 107, at 94
(comparing the SUA Convention's broad territorial reach with the narrower scope of
UNCLOS).
130. Under the SUA Convention, any person who "seizes or exercises control over
a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation" would violate the
convention. SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 3.
131. The SUA Convention authorizes, and under certain circumstances requires,
member states to establish jurisdiction over the perpetrators, either by extraditing
them to another member state or prosecuting the perpetrators themselves. The
following states are required to take measures necessary to establish jurisdiction over
the perpetrators: the state of which the perpetrator is a national, the state in whose
territorial waters the act was committed, and the flag state of the victim vessel. The
following states are permitted to exercise jurisdiction over the offenses: the state of
which the victim is a national, the state where the perpetrator has a habitual
residence, or the state where the offense was committed if the motive was to compel
a state to perform or to abstain from an act. Barrios, supra note 49, at 154-55.
132. See Azubuike, supra note 93, at 56 (expressing doubts as to the practical
effectiveness of the SUA Convention, as it only applies to countries that have adopted
the convention).
133. Bahar, supra note 8, at 26.
134. The SUA Convention has not been widely ratified by states for a variety of
reasons. States may feel that the SUA Convention modifies the approach to piracy
from the traditional view of piracy as sea-robbery toward piracy as a form of maritime
violence and possibly maritime terrorism. States may feel reluctant to change their
traditional conception of piracy, especially if they have not been targets of maritime
terrorism. See Halberstam, supra note 76 (describing the impediments to ratifying the
broader SUA Convention).
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(IMO's) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) developed two circulars
135
in 1993, MSC/622 and MSC/623.
These two circulars make
detailed recommendations to states for preventing and suppressing
136
piracy and provide guidance to the shipping industry. Additionally,
in
2005,
the
IMO
adopted
Resolution
A. 979 (24), which recommended taking legislative, judicial, and
137
law enforcement action to capture and prosecute pirates.
These
recommendations encouraged states to extradite pirates and to
138
provide vessels that would cooperate in combating piracy.
The SUA Convention was amended in 2005 by adding protocols
that called for member states to develop the capacity to capture and
prosecute offenders and required member states to designate which
government officials were authorized to receive and respond to
requests for assistance, confirm offenders' nationality, and take other
139
appropriate measures to curb pirate activity.
In Southeast Asia, the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) issued in 2003 its Statement on
Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Security, which
recognized that anti-piracy efforts "require regional maritime security
strategies
and
multilateral
cooperation
140
in their implementation."
Participating countries agreed to
exchange information, to discuss shipping lanes for tankers with
coastguard or naval escorts, and to consider methods to provide
"technical assistance[] and capacity-building infrastructure" to needy
141
countries. ARF countries also agreed to support "efforts to establish
142
a legal framework for regional cooperation to combat piracy."
In
November 2004, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia
(ReCAAP) was finalized with the goal of enhancing cooperation
135. See Carbin, supra note 19, at 52 (describing the factors that led to the passage
of IMO Doc. MSC/Circ. 622, which lists recommendations to governments for
preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships, and IMO Doc.
MSC/Circ. 623, which gives guidance to shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters, and
crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships).
136. Id.
137. Id.; Int'! Maritime Org. [IMO], Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Water.s
Off the Coast of Somalia, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 979 (24) (Nov. 23, 2005), available at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D25750/A979%2824%
29.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM STATEMENT ON
COOPERATION AGAINST PIRACY AND OTHER THREATS TO SECURI1Y ~ l(h) (2003),
available at http://www.aseansec.org/l 4837.htm.
141. Bahar, supra note 8, at 76.
142. Id. at 76-77.
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143

among Asian nations affected by piracy.
ReCAAP created the
Information Sharing Centre, which "facilitates the exchange of
piracy-related information" among member states. 144
Finally, in 2008, the U.N. Security Council adopted five resolutions
145
that addressed concerns about hijackings in Somali waters.
The
resolutions authorized nations that patrol the Gulf of Aden to enter
Somali territorial waters to fight or pursue pirates, and called on all
146
states to cooperate in efforts to capture and prosecute offenders.
The first resolution adopted, Resolution 1816, authorized nations
patrolling the Gulf of Aden to enter Somali territorial waters "for the
purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea," and,
while in Somali waters, to "[u]se ... in a manner consistent with
action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under
relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of
147
piracy and armed robbery."
Resolution 1816 effectively "make[s]
the rules of international law concerning piracy on the high seas
applicable also to territorial waters, inter alia permitting pursuit from
148
the high seas into these waters."
Moreover, Resolution 1816 gives
patrolling nations the authority to use force within Somali territorial
149
waters.
Another resolution passed by the U.N. Security Council in
December 2008, Resolution 1851, gives patrolling nations the
authority to "undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in
Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed
150
robbery at sea."
The Council's use of the expression "in Somalia"

143. About ReCAAP ISC, http:/ /recap.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Mar. 31,
2010).
144. Bahar, supra note 8, at 77. Fifteen countries are currently parties to the
ReCAAP Agreement: the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the
Kingdom of Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Union of
Myanmar, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of
Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand,
and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. About ReCAAP ISC, supra note 143.
145. S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, U.N.
Doc. (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008); S.C.
Res. 1838, U.N. Doc S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1816 Qune 2, 2008).
146. S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 145, 'lrn 2-4, 7(a).
147. Id. 11 7(a)-(b); see a/,so Carbin, supra note 19, at 52 (noting that international
law traditionally has permitted any state to capture pirates outside its jurisdiction).
148. Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast
ofSomalia, 20 EUR.J. INT'LL. 399, 400, 404 (2009).
149. See S.C. Res. 1816, supra 145, 11 7(b) (referring to the "all necessary means"
language).
150. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 145, 116.
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apparently authorizes action not only within Somali territorial waters
151
but also on mainland Somalia.
The expansive language of
Resolution 1851 arguably expands the scope of hot pursuit of pirates
152
by allowing chase to continue from Somali waters to Somali land.
However, this expansion challenges the traditional international
humanitarian law principle that civilians may not be targeted with
153
Somali pirates are
force on land, except in cases of self-defense.
154
also Somali civilians, albeit dangerous ones.
It is unclear how or if
Resolution 1851 's expanded authorization will be employed in
. 155
rea1tty.
Together, the five resolutions are designed to facilitate the task of
safeguarding the Gulf of Aden by extending patrolling nations'
jurisdictional and legal enforcement reach into Somalia.
The
resolutions, however, are limited in their scope because: (1) they
only apply to Somalia; (2) they are not meant to establish any new
rules of customary piracy law; (3) they require consent of the Somali
government for any undertaken action; ( 4) they require the
patrolling nations to respect international humanitarian law; and (5)
they pertain only to the current patrolling nations in the Gulf of
Aden. 156
Maritime powers and other nations willing to engage in the global
fight against piracy have jurisdiction to capture, detain, and
prosecute pirates based on domestic and international laws and
157
regulations.
Some of these regulations, however, are limited in
scope, and piracy-fighting countries may need to rely on creative legal
arguments in order to support their antipiracy operations. The
151. Treves, supra note 148, at 404.
152. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 145, 'll'll 2, 6; see also Kontorovich, supra note 4
(arguing that the language in Resolution 1851 broadens the use of force against
pirates because a state can pursue the pirate once on dry land).
153. See Kontorovich, supra note 4 (emphasizing that the Security Council
resolutions require that anti-pirate actions taken in Somali territory be approved by
the Somali provisional government and be consistent with international
humanitarian law).
154. Id.
155. Id. (explaining that the powers granted by the anti-pirate resolutions have
gone "largely if not entirely unutilized, with military action against pirates taking
place in international waters and confined to small, reportedly defensive incidents").
156. See Treves, supra note 148, at 404-08; see also Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in
Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More Is Needed, 33 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. (forthcoming
2010).
157. See John Bradford, Shifting the Tides Against Piracy in Southeast Asian Water.s, 48
As!AN SURV. 473, 485 (2008) (noting that the Southeast Asian Cooperation Against
Terrorism (SEACAT), which includes nations such as the United States, Thailand,
and Malaysia, enables countries to share resources in the pursuit of capturing and
deterring pirates).
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involvement of the U.N. Security Council will hopefully both provide
piracy-fighting countries with more direct legal support for their
actions and continue until this problem is solved.

III. PRACTICAL RESPONSES TO ELIMINATE PIRACY
The most significant practical solutions to eradicate piracy, in
Somalia or elsewhere, include (1) a serious commitment by the
affected state to fight pirates; (2) regional cooperation between the
affected state and its neighbors; (3) law enforcement and diplomatic
efforts to combat piracy; and (4) building the capacity of the affected
state by the most powerful maritime nations. These solutions have
already been employed in Southeast Asia, where piracy surged in the
late 1990s and the early 2000s but has been curbed and almost
eradicated in recent years. The Southeast Asian model will therefore
be examined below, and its application suggested for the Somali
piracy problem.

A.

State Commitment

The best results in the fight against piracy can be achieved if the
territorial state-the place where pirates base their operations, dock
their ships, and keep their prey-makes a significant commitment
158
toward eliminating piracy.
First, territorial states can combat piracy
by enacting harsh domestic criminal statutes that routinely hand
159
down stiff jail sentences to pirates.
Moreover, territorial states can
take an active role in antipiracy efforts by increasing law enforcement
efforts to patrol their coastlines and regional waters, ensuring that
pirates do not thrive undetected in areas beyond the reach of the
16
law. ° Finally, territorial states can crack down on the pirates'
communication with their supplier networks, which cuts off the
161
logistical support upon which pirate operations heavily rely.
States are most successful at fighting piracy when they are able to
162
invest substantial resources in combating pirates.
States that have
seen some success include Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, all of

158. Id. at 478.
159. Id. at 479-81.
160. See id. at 481 (explaining that after establishing the Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency, the Malaysian government increased enforcement efforts to
control wateiways and deter pirates).
161. See id. at 480 (discussing the situation in Malaysia, where the government is
targeting corrupt officials and military officers who are essential to the pirates'
operations).
162. Id. at 479.
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whom have battled pirates in the Malacca Strait and will be discussed
below.
Indonesia has strengthened its maritime security programs in
recent years by demonstrating that it is willing to crack down on
piracy on all levels. 163 The Indonesian government has acted against
pirates' shore contacts by attempting to rein in corrupt officials and
military officers whose support is necessary for successful piracy
164
operations.
Indonesia has also focused increasingly on maritime
security operations by sending over twenty navy ships and several
165
The Indonesian efforts seem to
aircraft into pirate-infested waters.
be working; for example, in March 2006, Indonesian marines and
special forces successfully liberated a 1,400-passenger ferry that had
166
been hijacked by fifteen pirates.
Malaysia has also been determined in its efforts to reduce piracy on
167
its side of the Malacca Strait.
The Malaysian government devoted
specific resources to areas where government control was the
168
weakest.
In those areas, the Malaysian government launched
programs to establish greater awareness and control over waterways
169
and to deter pirates from attacking in such waters.
Malaysia also
established the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, which
110
began patrols at the end of 2005.
According to Malaysian officials,
the increased patrols have resulted in several pirate arrests, and IMB
numbers show that the number of pirate attacks in the Strait of
171
Malacca has significantly decreased in the last few years.
Singapore, like Indonesia and Malaysia, has contributed to joint
patrols in the Strait of Malacca "using commandos, frigates, and swift
172
patrol boats."
Singapore has also ratified ReCAAP, whereby it will
173
participate in the agreement's regional piracy-fighting scheme.
As
in the example of Malacca Strait countries, significant territorial state

163. But see id. at 479-80 (noting that Indonesia "remains a country with one of
the world's highest piracy rates and the state remains distracted by other higher
priority concerns" such as "suppressing terrorism ... and alleviating poverty").
164. Id. at 480.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 480-81 (noting that the Malaysian government shifted its antipiracy
efforts to the waters around Sabah in East Malaysia where the lack of enforcement
was greatest).
169. Id. at 481.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 480-81.
172. Bahar, supra note 8, at 81.
173. Id. at 77.
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commitments to tackle piracy can contribute toward the decrease of
piracy attacks and even toward a complete eradication of pirate
activity.
While the above approach could work well in some regions, it may
pose significant challenges in chaotic and lawless countries like
174
"Piracy typically occurs where
Somalia, where piracy often thrives.
gaps exist in political control because it is in such areas that the
175
capacity of states to deal with the problem is weakest."
While
increased commitment on behalf of the territorial state to deal with
pirates helps tremendously, such commitment simply may not be
possible because of Somalia's lack of political, law enforcement, and
military capacity to confront the problem. To eradicate Somali
piracy, regional cooperation and capacity building may prove more
successful.
B.

Regi,onal Cooperation

When pirate attacks first surged in the Malacca Strait, the
Southeast Asian states that were most affected seemed hesitant to
work together and uninterested in establishing any form of active
176
cooperation against piracy.
That attitude has changed in the past
few years, as Southeast Asian states realized that regional cooperation
177
may be the best approach in the fight against piracy.
During the
late 1990s, Southeast Asian states actively participated in regional
178
meetings and discussed possible "confidence-building" activities.
These types of arrangements proved to be insufficient against
Malacca Strait pirates. 179 Since 2003, regional governments have
undertaken more significant cooperative efforts. 180 In a series of
statements, Southeast Asian states demonstrated their increased

174. Sterio, supra note 156.
175. Bradford, supra note 157, at 478.
176. Id. at 481.
177. See id. at 482; Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 44 (noting that in response to
the piracy threat in the Strait of Malacca, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia
"embarked on a program of coordinated air and sea patrols that dramatically
reduced marine piracy throughout the straits"); see also id. (describing the U.S.
response to piracy in 2007 which emphasized collaborative action between maritime
countries).
178. Stanley Weeks, New Initiatives in Maritime Cooperation, in THE BEST OF TIMES,
THE WORST OF TIMES: MARITIME SECURHY IN THE As!A-PACIFIC 251, 253 (Joshua Ho &
Catherine Zara Raymond eds., 2005).
179. Mal'k Valencia, Piracy and Politics in Southeast Asia, in PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST
AsIA: STATUS, ISSUES, AND RESPONSES 103, 105 (Derek Johnson & Mark Valencia eds.,
2005).
180. Bradford, supra note 157, at 482.
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181

resolve to seriously tackle piracy problems.
As a result, Malaysia,
182
Indonesia, and Singapore committed to cooperate with each other.
In July 2004, these three governments improved information sharing
and began a program of "trilateral coordinated maritime surface
183
patrols called the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols." In the years following
the initial program, the agreement was expanded to link surface and
air patrols with intelligence exchange in order to coordinate efforts
184
of surface and air units.
Moreover, the three governments
coordinated airborne surveillance under the so-called "Eyes in the
185
Sky" agreement.
"In the past few years, Southeast Asian littoral
states that had previously sought to downplay piracy have openly
acknowledged the problem, cooperation has risen to new levels, and
the three states bordering the Strait of Malacca have expanded the
forces deployed to deter attacks and catch pirates." 186 The decrease in
the number of pirate attacks in the Malacca Strait confirms that
regional cooperation between the Malaysian, Indonesian, and
Singaporean governments has been effective and successful in piracy
figh ting efforts. 18;
A similar type of regional cooperation has been established in West
and Central Africa. In July 2008, member states of the Maritime
Organization of West and Central Africa adopted a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) to create a joint coast guard and to authorize
188
hot pursuit of pirates off the coast of Nigeria.
It will be interesting
to follow developments off the Nigerian coast to determine whether
regional cooperation in West and Central Africa will lead to a
decrease in piracy. Considering the success of the Southeast Asia
program, this likely will be the case.
A similar type of regional cooperation could certainly be discussed
for Somalia. While Somalia does not have a government capable of

181. See id. (discussing statements issued by organizations such as the Tenth
ASEAN Regional Forum that met in Phnom Penh in June 2003, the June 2005
Shangri-Ia Dialogue in Singapore, the Batam Joint Statement of the fourth Tripartite
Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Strait of Malacca of August 2005,
and the Jakarta Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security, and Environmental
Protection in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore of September 2005).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 54 (noting that "[a] regional approach
to piracy in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore has led to significant reduction in
the incident of maritime piracy").
188. Carbin, supra note 19, at 55.
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significantly contributing to joint regional efforts to combat piracy,
other littoral states may be able to work together on this significant
problem. Kenya has already expressed its willingness to act as a
strong regional partner to the world maritime powers by agreeing to
prosecute
189
captured pirates in its domestic courts.
Arabian Peninsula
countries could similarly deploy more resources toward combating
piracy, especially in light of the challenge that piracy poses for oil
190
tankers that routinely pass through the Gulf of Aden.
Moreover, strong maritime countries could work closely with
regional partners on anti-piracy efforts. For example, in November
2008, the European Union established Operation Atlanta against
Somali pirates, and in January 2009, a multinational task force, which
included representatives from major maritime powers, created a
191
coalition of patrolling nations to protect the Gulf of Aden.
Such
maritime patrols led by maritime powers have successfully deterred
192
pirates and, in some cases, detained them.
In addition, these
maritime patrols could partner with regional countries, such as Kenya
and the Arabian Peninsula states, to improve the scope and breadth
of law enforcement operations. Even in the absence of Somalia,
increased regional cooperation between Kenya, the Arabian
Peninsula countries, and some of the largest maritime powers already
present in the Gulf of Aden, could contribute significantly toward the

189. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 51 (describing the attempt by Somali
pirates to hijack the Safina al Bisarat in 2006). A U.S. battleship that was in the
vicinity managed to seize control of the pirate vessel and detain ten pirates. Id. The
pirates were transferred to Mombasa, Kenya, convicted, and sentenced to seven-year
prison sentences. Id.
190. Id. It is worth noting that the IMO hosted a regional meeting in the Arabian
Peninsula twice: in Yemen in 2005 and in Oman in 2006. These meetings were
focused on the possibility of establishing regional agreements to implement
antipiracy
measures.
Id. at 54.
191. Carbin, supra note 19, at 52.
192. See, e.g., Daniel Wallis, NATO Frees 20 Hostages; Pirates Seize Belgian Ship,
REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLil 1637320090418
(last visited on Mar. 20, 2010) (noting that France has brought captured pirates to
Paris for prosecution); see also Al Goodman, Somali Pirate Suspects Indicted in Spain,
CNN.COM, (Nov. 16, 2009)
http:/ /edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/l l/16/spain.pirates/index.html
(discussing that Spain indicted two Somali pirates in a Spanish court); Suspect in Ship
Hijacking Charged with Piracy, CNN.COM, (Apr. 21, 2009)
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/20/ny.pirate.indictment/index.html
(noting that the United States has indicted a detained Somali pirate in a U.S. court).
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193

eradication of Somali piracy.
The Strait of Malacca regional
cooperation model should be examined carefully as a viable solution
to the Somali piracy problem.

C.

Capacity Building

The world's biggest maritime powers should be willing and able to
help fight Somali piracy. In the context of Southeast Asian piracy,
countries like Australia, China, India, Japan, and the United States all
194
offered different forms of assistance.
As mentioned above, NATO
countries have also assisted in the Gulf of Aden by forming regular
195
patrols that often chase and apprehend pirates.
Capacity building
through continuous assistance by the world's maritime powers is a
196
In
key element to a successful long-term solution against piracy.
the case of Somalia, capacity building and assistance by maritime
powers is even more essential than it was in Southeast Asia.
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the three Southeast Asian nations
most affected by piracy in the Malacca Straits, are relatively stable
nations that were able to fight piracy on their own to a certain
degree. Somalia, to the contrary, is a failed state and can do very
197
little to curb piracy off its coast.
Because of their stability,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were able to collaborate
successfully on anti-piracy operations; Somalia, however, is unlikely to
be capable of cooperating successfully and contributing to any
regional antipiracy efforts. Thus, the case for capacity building in
Somalia seems even stronger than that of its counterpart in Southeast
Asia.
Japan, a powerful maritime nation, is an excellent model for the
types of capacity-building and assistance that countries like Somalia
may need. Over the last decade, the Japanese Coast Guard has been
conducting anti-piracy exercises throughout the Southeast Asian
198
Japan also provides direct assistance to littoral states; for
region.
example, it has provided Malaysian forces with "satellite tracking
193. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 41 ("While it is impossible to eradicate
maritime piracy completely, the threat can be greatly reduced if we broaden efforts
to work with international partners.").
194. Bradford, supra note 157, at 483.
195. See, e.g., Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 42 (recognizing the combined
patrol efforts of NATO and the European Union).
196. Bradford, supra note 157, at 483.
197. Treves, supra note 148, at 400.
198. See Bradford, supra note 157, at 483-84 (discussing the material and training
thatJapan has offered to neighboring countries because of the threat pirates pose to
its national security and economic stability).
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systems, satellite telephones, high-capacity computers, and radio
199
communications systems." Japan has also pledged over $15 million
200
to Indonesia to construct patrol ships and vessels.
On a
multinational level, Japan's prime mm1ster initially proposed
ReCAAP, the world's first inter-governmental body focused on piracy,
201
and thirteen other regional states joined the agreement.
202
The United States has also contributed to the fight against piracy.
United States maritime forces have conducted a series of exercises
203
with their Southeast Asian regional partners. Moreover, the United
States has been promoting the systemic sharing of information and
the use of information technologies that enable regional states to
204
better identify, capture, and deter pirates.
Although some
Southeast Asian states were initially skeptical about American
intrusion into their sovereign waters, officials from Malaysia and
Singapore have recently expressed enthusiasm about increased
205
American efforts to help curb Malacca Strait piracy. If American or
other foreign nations' involvement in Somalia is carefully planned so
that any military operations within the Somali territory retain their
antipiracy scope and do not appear to threaten Somali sovereignty
and territorial integrity, then such foreign powers' involvement likely
206
will be appreciated and welcomed in East Africa.
Similar but more comprehensive capacity building efforts need to
occur in Somalia. Maritime powers such as the United States need to
realize that their own interests may be indirectly threatened by the
207
increased incidence of pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean.
Somali
199. Id. at 484.
200. Id.
201. Id.; see also supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (describing the ASEAN
Regional Forum and the efforts of its member countries).
202. Bradford, supra note 157, at 484.
203. Id. at 485.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Peter O'Neil, Aid Agencies Release Scathing Critique of Afghan Counter
insurgency Efforts, CANADA.COM, Apr. 3, 2009,
http:/ /www.canada.com/news/agencies+release+scathing+critique+Afghan+counter
+insurgency+efforts/1460393/story.html (suggesting that interference by other
nations is not easily accepted and noting that a group of international aid agencies
issued a scathing report regarding counter-insurgency efforts by countries such as
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada). Great powers such as the
United States have been criticized for their over involvement in other nations'
internal affairs. Id. Thus, a power such as the United States must be careful in its
approach to Somalia in order to ensure that any military involvement corresponds to
pure antipiracy operations and does not resemble intervention or invasion.
207. Bradford, supra note 157, at 484 (noting that the United States assisted in the
eradication of Southeast Asian piracy because of "non-traditional security concerns"
such as terrorism and seaborne proliferation of weapons of mass destruction).
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pirates may develop ties to terrorist groups that operate directly
208
against American interests such as al-Qaida.
Moreover, Somali
pirates could fund or partner with other terrorist organizations and
209
thus contribute to an overall rise in global violence.
Somali piracy
could also threaten the regional stability of East Africa, and has the
potential to undermine the national security of neighboring states
like Ethiopia and Kenya, which, although more stable than Somalia,
210
already have their share of domestic problems.
Accordingly,
maritime powers like the United States need to begin investing in
Somalia, and should undertake significant capacity building projects,
as Japan did in Southeast Asia, to help stabilize the region.
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR SOMALIA

Many legal and practical tools, some theoretical and some already
utilized in Southeast Asia, are available to fight Somali piracy. But
the question remains: once Somali pirates are captured by piracy
fighting nations, where should they be brought to justice? The
sections below explore this question and seek to provide insightful
answers.
A.

Legal

As stated above, fighting piracy in Somalia should be grounded in
law: countries involved in patrolling the coast of Somalia need to
both have a sound basis available to justify their seizure of pirates and
211
find appropriate tribunals willing to prosecute detained individuals.

1. jurisdiction
Piracy-fighting countries can rely on a variety of international
treaties, customary law, and U.N. Security Council resolutions in
order to justify their capture and prosecution of apprehended
pirates. UNCLOS, the most widely accepted international maritime
212
treaty, already provides that any nation may capture pirates on the
high seas. The capturing nation may then prosecute pirates in its
208. See supra Part LC (discussing the link between piracy and terrorism).
209. Id.
210. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 43 (noting that the issues in this region
range from disrupting maritime communication to hindering the delivery of oil
throughout the world).
211. See supra Parts II.A, II.B (discussing both domestic and international piracy
laws).
212. See supra Part H.B. (discussing UNCLOS in relation to other maritime
treaties).
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213

domestic courts.
The SUA Convention extends the jurisdictional
basis for the capture and prosecution of pirates by allowing any
nation to capture pirates if the victim vessel was in some form of
international transit, and by authorizing both the capturing nation
214
and other willing nations to prosecute the captured pirates.
A
combination of these two treaties would arguably fill the
jurisdictional gaps and would prevent pirates from escaping capture
215
and prosecution through legal jurisdictional maneuvers.
The problem with this hypothesis is two-fold. First, the SUA
Convention is not as widely accepted as UNCLOS and does not
·
.
11aw. 216 Th us, countnes
. t h at are not
represent customary mternatJona
signatories to the SUA Convention, such as Somalia, Indonesia, and
Malaysia, may escape its reach by pointing out that they never agreed
217
to the convention's extended jurisdictional reach.
Second, even
countries bound by the SUA Convention have other legal obligations
that may impede the functioning of this maritime treaty. For
example, many western democracies are party to major human rights
treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights or the Convention Against Torture. 218 All such human rights
treaties prohibit the transfer of any individual to a country where the
individual is likely to be tortured (the non-refoulement obligation). 219
Consequently, a capturing nation that is bound by these human
rights treaties may not be able to transfer captured pirates to a third
state willing to prosecute them if there is a strong likelihood that the
220
third state would torture pirates.
In this regard, human rights
obligations may have the effect of limiting broad prosecution regimes
such as SUA, thereby reducing their practical value.
Piracy-fighting countries may be able to circumvent the above
issues by relying on international custom. In fact, some scholars
argue that UNCLOS did not simply codify existing international
213. UNCLOS, supra note 70, art. 105.
214. See SUA Convention, supra note 76, art. 7.
215. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 52 ("Piracy thus flourishes at the seams of
globalization because jurisdiction is unclear and pirates exploit the inherent
isolation of individual vessels and nations.").
216. Alfred P. Rubin, The Fletcher Sch., Tufts Univ., Comments at ASIL Meeting
(Mar. 26, 2009).
217. Azubuike, supra note 93, at 56 (concluding that the SUA Convention is not
reflective of customary law and only binds its signatory parties).
218. Kontorovich, supra note 4, at n.9 (noting that such treaties include the
Geneva Conventions on the Law of War and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights).
219. Id.
220. Id.
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customary law in the area of piracy, but rather restricted existing
customary norms. 221 Thus, customary law goes farther than UNCLOS
222
in providing jurisdiction to both capture and prosecute pirates.
If
piracy-fighting countries can establish that international custom in
the area of piracy law allows nations to pursue and apprehend pirates
anywhere, not simply on the high seas, then nations potentially could
target Somali pirates without worrying about territorial sea
restrictions.
Moreover, while it is trUe that hot pursuit of pirates into the Somali
territorial waters would violate state sovereignty under article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter, 223 one can advance the argument that
apprehending pirates does not undermine Somali territorial
integrity.
In fact, capturing pirates could work to strengthen
Somalia's territorial integrity by ensuring that rogue pirate operators
do not threaten its future stability. Piracy-fighting nations would
simply be doing something that Somalia could and should do for
224
itself-capturing dangerous pirates. No evidence suggests that such
actions threaten Somalia as a country or its sovereign national
interests.
Furthermore, if piracy-fighting countries can establish that
international custom in the area of piracy law allows any state, not
simply the capturing state, to prosecute pirates under the principle of
universal jurisdiction, then the legal hurdle of finding an adequate
forum to try Somali pirates could be surmounted. "Piracy is the
225
original universal jurisdiction crime," and it can be argued under
customary law that the principle of universal jurisdiction itself would
be contradicted by the limitation of allowing only the capturing
221. See Barrios, supra note 49, at 162 (asserting that UNCLOS represents a
"significant departure from what the international community accepted as piracy").
222. Bahar, supra note 8, at 27-38 (exploring the customary law definition of
piracy, arguing that it embraces acts of maritime terrorism committed for political
aims, and then alleging that UNCLOS simply codifies this broader definition of
piracy under customary law).
223. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, (prohibiting member states from using force
against any other member state in violation of that state's sovereignty and territorial
integrity).
224. In fact, scholars have already argued that the UNCLOS system of requiring
that the act of piracy happen on the high seas in order for the convention's universal
jurisdiction provisions to be triggered works only if the coastal state has a municipal
law proscribing pirate attacks, is willing to enforce it, and is physically able to do so.
See Bahar, supra note 8, at 19 (concluding that in Somalia, the UNCLOS system does
not work because Somalia is unable to do anything about the pirate attacks due to
the absence of a functional government).
225. Kontorovich, supra note 4; see also Azubuike, supra note 93, at 44 (noting that
under customary international law, pirates were subject to universal jurisdiction by
any state).
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nation to bring pirates to justice. Pirates, after all, are hostis humani
generi, and as such, they should face justice in any willing state's
226
courts, regardless of whether that state captured them or not.
Thus, customary law may help piracy-fighting countries by filling the
UNCLOS-inflicted gaps and by extending the treaty's reach.
Piracy-fighting countries in the Somali context can also rely on
U.N. Security Council Resolutions, which expand the geographical
227
area in which pirates can be effectively apprehended.
The five
different resolutions, passed in 2008, allow nations that routinely
patrol the Gulf of Aden to enter Somali territorial waters if seeking to
capture pirates. 228
The resolutions allow patrolling nations to
penetrate the Somali mainland in their piracy-fighting operations, as
229
well as to engage in the hot pursuit of pirates on Somali territory.
The resolutions are thus an important legal tool for piracy-fighting
countries because they extend jurisdiction to capture pirates into an
otherwise prohibited zone:
the Somali territorial waters and
mainland.
While it is true that the resolutions also contain
limitations,230 they nonetheless represent an important vehicle
allowing patrolling nations' navy ships to combat pirates. Moreover,
to the extent that the above customary international law arguments
are accepted, they would supplement the Security Council
resolutions and would apply to the Somali context even if the
resolutions themselves were no longer temporally applicable.

2.

Piracy trials
Piracy fighting countries currently face a tremendous problem:
what to do with captured pirates? Determining which state could and
should prosecute pirates captured at sea is difficult, and "it takes
226. Azubuike, supra note 93, at 44 (commenting that under customary
international law, pirates were treated as "enemies of human kind").
227. See supra Part Il.B (discussing the various international treaties regulating
piracy).
228. See supra notes 146--156 and accompanying text (discussing the passage and
substance of the five U.N. Security Council resolutions relating to piracy passed in
2008).
229. Kontorovich, supra note 4.
230. Treves, supra note 148, at 404-08 (discussing the resolutions' limitations,
which include: temporal jurisdiction; the fact that each resolution is only valid for a
six-month period and needs to be renewed thereafter by the U.N. Security Council;
the need to obtain consent from the Somali government for each transgression into
Somali territory by the patrolling nations; the fact that authority to enter Somali
territory is only given to countries presently patrolling the Gulf of Aden; the fact that
each resolution specifies that it only pertains to Somalia and does not purport to
modify customary law; and the necessity for the patrolling nations in each instance to
respect international humanitarian law).
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231

awhile to sort out the logistical and legal issues." This Article argues
that maritime powers interested in combating Somali pirates should
232
ensure that pirates are tried in criminal forums.
Various
prosecution options exist, ranging from domestic trials in the courts
of the capturing or transferee nations, to international trials in
specialized piracy tribunals.
First, pirates could always be prosecuted in the domestic courts of
the capturing nation. 233 While piracy trials may be logistically
difficult, costly, and politically challenging, piracy is a serious crime
234
and should never go unpunished and undeterred.
Piracy-fighting
countries should overcome their own political unwillingness to
prosecute individual pirates, and routinely bring captured pirates to
trial in their own courts. Major maritime powers, like the United
States, France, and Spain, have already begun criminal proceedings
against captured pirates; more nations should follow suit in this
235
direction.
Second, pirates could also be prosecuted in the domestic courts of
a regional partner-a nation willing to take all captured pirates and
to subject them to its own criminal process. The United Kingdom, a
236
maritime power uninterested in prosecuting pirates domestically,
has experimented with this option. The country has entered into an
MOU with Kenya, a regional partner, whereby Kenya has agreed to
237
prosecute any pirates the United Kingdom transfers to it.
This
agreement, although of dubious legality under UNCLOS, may work

231. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 45.
232. Unfortunately, some pirates have already been released from custody by the
capturing nation because of a lack of an available legal forum in which to prosecute
them. For example, in September 2008, the Danish navy released several captured
pirates on a Somali beach because of unclear jurisdictional rules. Id. at 46. This
approach, dubbed "catch and release," has been criticized. Id.
233. Prosecuting Somali pirates in Somalia is not currently an option because
Somalia is a failed state and does not have any responsible legal authorities capable
of conducting a piracy trial. Id.
234. See supra Part I.C. l. (discussing the importance of deterring Somali pirates).
235. France successfully captured pirates twice in 2008 and brought the pirates to
trial in Paris. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 46. Spain has recently brought two
pirates to Spain to stand trial there. Goodman, supra note 192. In April 2009, after a
group of pirates attempted to seize the Maersk Alabama in the Indian Ocean, the
United States captured a pirate and brought the detained pirate to New York to
stand trial. Suspect in Ship Hijacking Charged with Piracy, supra note 192.
236. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 46 (noting that the British Foreign
Ministry has indicated that P,irates brought into the country to be prosecuted "could
be granted political asylum').
237. Id.; see also Azubuike, supra note 94, at 55 (discussing the agreement between
the United States, the United Kingdom and Kenya governing the transfer of
captured pirates to Kenya for trial).
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238

well.
For example, a group of pirates captured in 2006 were
prosecuted in Kenya and given seven-year prison sentences. 239
Additional trials of this sort may help strengthen the transfer
mechanism and send a strong deterrent message to Somali pirates,
who can expect to face trial in Kenya instead of anticipating release if
240
captured by the United Kingdom.
Other maritime powers should
reach out to regional partners willing to prosecute Somali pirates, in
241
the way the United Kingdom reached out to Kenya.
Regional partnerships are an attractive option for a variety of
reasons. First, these partnerships end the cycle of impunity by
ensuring that pirates do not avoid prosecution simply because the
capturing nation does not want to try them in its domestic courts.
Under this model, captured pirates would always be transferred to a
partner state for prosecution. Moreover, regional partnerships allow
242
for a regional solution to piracy.
Instead of transferring captured
pirates to a geographically distant country, like the United States or
the United Kingdom, this model allows pirates to be prosecuted in
the courts of a regional partner, such as Kenya, a country bordering
Somalia.
Second, regional trials espouse a number of benefits. Regional
trials may send a stronger deterrent message to existing pirates, who
may hear and know more about a Kenyan trial than an American or
British proceeding. Regional trials may also illustrate that African
countries are capable of dealing with problems on their own and that
the developed world need not impose its own justice by handing
238. The majority of scholars interpret UNCLOS as authorizing only the
capturing nation to prosecute pirates, and as prohibiting pirate transfers to third
countries for prosecution. See Kontorovich, supra note 4 (stating that UNCLOS
drafting history makes clear that it was "intended to preclude transfers to third-party
states").
239. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 47.
240. In another piracy incident-the hijacking of the Japanese tanker Alondra
Rainbow-the Indian Navy captured the pirates and their ship and transported the
ship to India, where the pirates were prosecuted and convicted. India, therefore, has
also conducted a domestic piracy trial. Azubuike, supra note 93, at 55; see also
Peppetti, supra note 107, at 108-09 (discussing the Alondra Rainbow incident in more
depth and noting that India tried the pirates under universal jurisdiction, as there is
no piracyjurisdiction in the Indian penal code).
241. The United States also signed an MOU with Kenya on Jan. 16, 2009. See
James Thuo Gathii, Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-national Pirates Captured by Third States
Under Kenyan and International Law, 32 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://works.bepress.com/james_gathii/16/. Kenya also signed a
similar MOU with the European Union on March 6, 2009, and another MOU has
been discussed between Kenya and China. Id.
242. Bahar, supra note 8, at 83 (arguing that regional pirate prosecution
reinforces the view that Africans are capable of establishing and maintaining a good
system of governance).
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down western criminal sentences to captured pirates. ~ Finally,
regional trials make sense logistically: evidence and witnesses are
located much closer to Kenya than to the United States or Britain
and therefore, Kenyan courts may face significantly fewer hurdles in
the prosecution of Somali pirates than their American or British
244
counterparts.
Therefore, maritime nations combating Somali
pirates should explore regional partnerships more substantially.
Third, pirates could be prosecuted in an ad hoc piracy tribunal.
Scholars have considered the idea of a new ad hoc tribunal dedicated
to the issue of piracy that would be located in the region and
245
routinely prosecute captured Somali pirates. This idea is appealing
from a theoretical standpoint, but it may have significant drawbacks
from a practical standpoint. Establishing a new tribunal would be
difficult to say the least: the tribunal must be located in a country
willing and capable of accommodating an international body; include
highly-trained judges who are experts in maritime law; and provide
fine-tuned laws to ensure all captured pirates receive a fair and just
246
trial.
From a cost perspective, the establishment of a new ad hoc
piracy tribunal may simply outweigh the resources available to fight
piracy. An ad hoc piracy tribunal, for all the above reasons, will likely
never be established.
Fourth, pirates could be prosecuted in the International Criminal
Court (ICC), provided that the court's jurisdiction is amended to
247
allow prosecutions of piracy-related crimes.
Some scholars have
already expressed regret that the ICC statute as originally drafted did
248
not contemplate the crime of piracy.
Because piracy is a universal
jurisdiction crime, it is logical that pirates would be prosecuted in the
only universal criminal court. When the ICC statute was negotiated,
piracy seemed to have vanished and certainly did not represent the
issue of global magnitude that it does today. Thus, the ICC drafters
243. Id.
244. Id. at 82.
245. Id. at 81-84 (advocating for the creation of a regional piracy court in Kenya).
246. See Peppetti, supra note 107, at 142 (noting that creating an ad hoc tribunal
"would require significant effort and depend upon a strong desire for individual
accountability coupled with a willingness to delegate sovereignty over certain
criminal justice matters").
247. See Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New
International Law, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 328-30, 335 (2006)
(arguing that ICC jurisdiction should be expanded to include a crime of terrorism
and that piracy should fall within the definition of terrorism and thus be covered by
the newly expanded ICC statute).
248. Azubuike, supra note 93, at 55 ("It is a gaping omission that the Statute of the
International Criminal Court did not deal with piracy.").
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may not have had enough of an interest or incentive to include the
crime of piracy in the court's statute. Today, in light of the changed
climate in Somalia and the dangers posed by piracy, major super
powers may have sufficient political incentive to come together and
to redraft the ICC statute to include the crime of piracy. At the least,
the ICC statute could adopt the UNCLOS restricted definition of
piracy, as most countries already accept this definition as customary
law and would likely not object to its formulation in the ICC. If
pirates were prosecuted in the ICC, however, the court's judges
would need to develop expertise in maritime law, and the court's
caseload and dockets would increase significantly. This increase
could cause problems for the ICC, as the court was established with
limited resources and with the notion that it would only prosecute
249
those responsible for the gravest violations of international law.
While Somali pirates may be dangerous, they probably do not
amount to the type of heinous defendant contemplated by the ICC
drafters. The ICC model, although attractive, may contain significant
limitations and may ultimately prove of little value.
Finally, pirates could be prosecuted in the International Tribunal
250
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
This tribunal, established in 1996,
251
is a specialized court equipped to deal with maritime disputes and is
composed of highly trained judges who are experts on the law of the
sea. 252 ITLOS would represent the ideal venue for the prosecution of
captured pirates. 253 Because it is already a functioning tribunal, no
additional costs would be incurred if pirates were prosecuted here,
unlike in the ad hoc tribunal model, where significant monetary
contributions would be needed by major maritime powers in order to

249. About
the
International
Criminal
Court,
http:/ /www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
250. ITLOS Website, General Information, http:/ /www.itlos.org/start2_en.html
(follow "ITLOS Website" hyperlink; then follow "General Information - Overview"
hyperlink; then follow "Introduction" hyperlink) (last visited May 15, 2010).
251. ITLOS
Website,
International
Tribunal
Law
for
the
Sea,
http:/ /www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow "General Information - Overview"
hyperlink; then follow "International Tribunal Law for the Law of the Sea"
hyperlink) (last visited May 15, 2010).
252. Id.
253. But see Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea [ITLOS],
No. 135 (Apr. 24, 2009), availabl,e at http:/ /www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow
"News - Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "2009" hyperlink) ("Recently certain
news organizations have been circulating erroneous information stating that the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is prepared to try pirates. This
information is inaccurate, since, in accordance with the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, the Tribunal deals mainly with disputes between States Parties
to the Convention; it is not a criminal court and has no competence to try Pirates.").
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start the process. ITLOS judges are highly trained; thus, no training
would be needed and no additional personnel costs incurred by any
nation. While it is true that the ITLOS statute would need to be
amended to provide for jurisdiction over the crime of piracy, this
process could be less difficult than that needed to amend the ICC
statute. ITLOS already includes a variety of maritime issues and
254
offenses.
The crime of piracy fits into the statutory scheme, and it
does not represent a significant departure from the types of issues
255
that this tribunal already handles.
Finally, because ITLOS was
designed to deal with all maritime issues between its member states,
not simply the most heinous disputes and offenders, it could arguably
accommodate a higher number of trials without losing any of its
original establishing characteristics. Accordingly, ITLOS may be an
appropriate choice of venue for the prosecution of Somali pirates.
All of the above types of tribunals are possible venues for the
prosecution of Somali pirates. Piracy-fighting countries must ensure
that for each detained pirate, one of the available tribunals is used for
a piracy prosecution. Detained pirates should never be released or
benefit from any de facto form of impunity, and pirate prosecution
should fit within a structure of regional and global antipiracy efforts.
In the same manner that countries have cooperated to form law
enforcement and military antipiracy operations, such countries
should collaborate to ensure that every pirate is brought before a
jurisdiction that is prepared to mete out legal punishment.

B.

Practical

For a true solution to the Somali piracy problem, greater
cooperation between Somalia and its neighboring states and an
improved commitment by major maritime states to increase their
patrolling and law enforcement presence in the Gulf of Aden and
farther out in the Indian Ocean is needed. "What is needed now is a
network of shipping states, regional partners, and major maritime
powers that can collaborate on how to respond to piracy attacks." 256
Additionally, shipping companies themselves, who may be the biggest
victims of pirate attacks, should join in the fight against piracy by
254. ITLOS Website, supra note 251. ITLOS has four different chambers
adjudicating different types of disputes: the Chamber of Summary Procedure, the
Chamber for Fisheries Disputes, the Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes, and
the Chamber for Maritime Delimitation Disputes.
255. Id. (noting that ITLOS has mandatory jurisdiction in cases involving
detention and release of crews and vessels).
256. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 42.
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contributing financially and logistically to states' piracy-fighting
efforts.
1.

Regi,onal cooperation between Somalia and neighboring states
As discussed above, piracy has been almost eradicated in Southeast
Asia through regional efforts and cooperation by the most concerned
257
countries:
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
The three
countries negotiated a series of surveillance and law enforcement
measures in order to work together on the prevention and eventual
258
elimination of pirate attacks.
Such efforts include joint maritime
patrols, regional information sharing on piracy attacks and
259
intelligence data, and joint efforts in the apprehension of pirates.
Other Asian countries have undertaken similar efforts, as evidenced
260
by the ReCAAP Agreement.
Moreover, similar types of cooperation
261
already exist among countries fighting narco-traffickers.
The
United States has concluded several cooperation agreements with
Central and Latin American countries, wherein countries have
262
agreed to combine efforts to fight narco-traffickers.
The United
States has also initiated a partnership activity, the Proliferation
Security Initiative, aimed at "counter[ing] the proliferation of
263
weapons of mass destruction, particularly at sea."
Under this
partnership, "states commit to share information and disrupt the
transfer or transport of weapons of mass destruction in accordance
264
with a set of interdiction principles."
Similarly, central and west
African countries established a maritime organization in 1975, and
later, a sub-regional coast guard network for cooperation on
suppressing piracy, terrorism at sea, illegal fishing, drug trafficking,
fuel theft and smuggling, pipeline security, and maritime accident
265
response.
These types of agreements represent a good model for
the kind of cooperation needed in Somalia. Because Somalia does
not have the capability to combat piracy alone, it should investigate
the possibility of working with strong regional partners, such as Kenya

257. See supra Part III.B (discussing the various types of regional cooperation).
258. See supra Part III.B.
259. See supra Part Ill.B.
260. See Bradford, supra note 157, at 484 (discussing antipiracy efforts in Japan).
261. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 49.
262. See id. (noting the presence of nearly thirty narco-trafficking agreements,
which oblige nations to "expedite communication on legal and jurisdictional issues
associated with emergent countemarcotic operations at sea").
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 51.
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and Arabian Peninsula countries, in order to stifle the growth of
piracy, similar to what other countries have done in the area of narco
trafficking and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
First, Somalia could look for regional partners willing to employ
their own maritime forces to patrol the Somali coast, thereby
preventing pirates from freely operating from Somali ports out into
the sea. If Somali coastal towns were routinely patrolled and
inspected, pirate operations likely would be hindered if not
eliminated altogether. 266 Somalia could request assistance from the
same regional partners in patrolling the Gulf of Aden and areas of
the Indian Ocean relatively close to the Somali coast or particularly
prone to pirate attacks. The increased presence of maritime patrols
throughout the local seas could ward off at least some pirate attacks
as well as provide additional security to ships sailing through those
waters. Second, Somalia could work on information and data sharing
with its regional partners in order to best predict the likelihood of
pirate attacks in certain waters and to identify possibly suspicious
ships spotted by its regional partners. Information sharing, like that
of the Southeast Asian paradigm, could significantly increase the
probability of pirate apprehension and thereby reduce the frequency
of pirate attacks. Third, Somalia could conclude jurisdictional
agreements with regional partners, allowing such partners to
prosecute apprehended pirates, to the extent that Somalia is unable
to do so. Through a regional network of countries willing to provide
their criminal courts as prosecution venues for apprehended pirates,
the likelihood of pirates being released after capture due to the
unavailability of appropriate prosecution venues would be drastically
reduced.
Moreover, regional agreements, such as that already in place
between Kenya and the United Kingdom, would allow for pirate
prosecutions regionally, providing an African solution to an African
267
problem.
This would also avoid situations such as the United
266. Of course, Somalia would have to agree to allow regional countries into its
own territory for patrol and inspection purposes.
267. Diplomats have already called for an African solution to the African piracy
crisis. See Jim Fisher-Thompson, Diplomat Says Horn of Africa Crises Require African
Solution, AMERICA.GOV, Mar. 13, 2009,
http://www.america.gov/st/peacesecenglish/2009/March/200903131100501 ejrehsi
F0.5235
559.html&distid=ucs (discussing former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn's
remark that "[t]he United States cannot and should not be expected to solve the
problems of the Horn [of Africa] on its own"). Acting Assistant Secretary for Africa
Phillip Carter has also stated that "the peace process [in Somalia] must be Somali
owned and-led." Id.
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States' decision to prosecute a Somali pirate in New York, which has
been criticized as an inappropriate venue for Somali pirate
268
prosecutions.
If Somalia had a regional partnership in place with
some of its neighbors, then most pirates would ultimately face trial
somewhere close to Somalia.
Finally, Somalia could create
agreements with regional partners for the detention of tried pirates,
because Somalia may simply not have enough space in its own jails.
If pirates served their sentences under appropriate conditions in the
prisons of willing regional partners, then major maritime powers
apprehending pirates might have fewer qualms about delivering
pirates to places where they could face inhumane detention
conditions. Thus, a regional scheme of law enforcement and
cooperation between Somalia and its neighbors could produce
significant results in the fight against piracy.
Improved maritime patrols by major maritime powers
Major maritime powers already patrol the Gulf of Aden, but these
269
patrols could do more.
Piracy has flourished in Somalia in part
because of a lack of commitment by global maritime powers to
engage in a true fight against pirates. Because piracy works at a
supranational level, no particular country's national interests are
270
threatened
by
any
single
pirate
attack.
A great majority of pirate attacks take place against ships flying flags
of-convenience from developing countries. In fact, ships routinely
271
charter in countries like Liberia or Panama, which provide them
with the friendliest business and tax laws. 272 In some instances, ships
2.

268. Tony Karon, Why New York Is No Place to Try Somali Pirates, TIME, Apr. 21, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892895,00.html.
269. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 42 (noting that NATO and European
Union countries have deployed warships to the Gulf of Aden to conduct patrols, and
that the United Kingdom, Canadian, Turkish, German, Danish, Dutch, French,
Pakistani, Indian, Iranian, and Russian navies have also deployed ships to the area,
but that these patrols have had limited success).
270. Id. at 45 ("It is typical of the vessels attacked by Somali pirates that the ship
may be registered in one nation, such as Greece, owned by a corporation located in
another nation, such as South Korea, and operated by a crew comprised of nationals
of several additional countries, such as the Philippines and Pakistan. Furthermore,
the vessel is likely to be transporting either containerized cargo or bulk commodities
owned by companies in another country, and the piracy attack may have been
interrupted by a warship from yet another nation.").
271. Id. at 46.
272. Gabel, supra note 63, at 1439 (discussing the phenomenon of flags-of
convenience and concluding that "[t]his system also now allows shippers to hire
cheap labor, to avoid the high cost of American crews and the burdens of stringent
regulation, and to limit the financial consequences of any foundering or loss of a
ship").
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even charter in land-locked countries, like the Central African
Republic, because such places provide them with excellent tax
273
shelters and numerous business advantages.
Those flag-of
convenience countries either completely lack interest in fighting
274
Somali pirates, or they do not have adequate resources to do so.
Major maritime powers that may have the resources to battle pirates
may not have an incentive to do so if their own ships are not being
275
attacked.
Moreover, Somali pirates often kidnap the victim vessel's
crewmembers, and the majority of crewmembers come from the
developing world. 276 As a result, maritime powers have little incentive
to work toward crewmembers' release or toward the prevention of
future hijackings because their own nationals are not held captive.
In recent months, however, pirates have gone after ships coming
from the developed world: a U.S. ship was attacked in April 2009; a
British luxury yacht was overtaken in the fall of 2009; and a Spanish
277
ship was captured in the fall of 2009.
These incidents have
captured the attention of major maritime powers, urging them to
focus more strongly on the Gulf of Aden and other waters off the
Somali coast.
Maritime powers should increase their presence in the Indian
Ocean and waters farther away from the Gulf of Aden and the Somali
coast in order to intensify the frequency of patrols and the protection
extended to ships sailing these treacherous waters. Some recent
pirate attacks have occurred closer to the Seychelles and several
hundred miles out into the Indian Ocean. 278 Maritime powers should
273. J. Ashley Roach, Former U.S. Dept. of State, Comments at ASIL Meeting,
(Mar. 26, 2009) (discussing pirate ransoms, and calling piracy "more profitable than
fishing").
274. Halberstam, supra note 76 (discussing the reticence of flag-of-convenience
states to do anything about piracy).
275. For example, legal and policy reasons have led some maritime powers, like
Great Britain and Germany, to avoid capturing pirates or to release them after
temporarily detaining them. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 56. The Netherlands
has already released pirates without taking any legal action against them. Id.
276. Katherine Shepherd, Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Comments at ASIL Meeting, (Mar. 26, 2009) (discussing "ship riders," which are the
people on the hijacked ship, and how the hijacked ship HMS Cumberland contained
Yemeni fishermen who had been held hostage by the pirates).
277. See Azubuike, supra note 93, at 57 (discussing the Somali pirate attack on a
U.S. ship, Maersk Alabama, in April 2009); see also Goodman, supra note 192
(discussing a Somali pirate attack on a Spanish ship); Pirates Demand $7 million for
Yacht Coupl£, Britain Says, CNN.COM, Oct. 31, 2009,
http:/ /www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/10/30/yacht.pirates/index.html?iref=al
!search (discussing a hijacking of a British luxury yacht by Somali pirates).
278. Roach, supra note 273.
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also increase the number of military and naval personnel present on
board the patrolling ships, so that suspicious ships can be stopped
and boarded, and any pirates can be detained if necessary. Finally,
maritime powers should ensure that they have enough powerful
weapons on board their patrolling ships, so that in case of actual
battle with the pirates, maritime powers can defend themselves.
Increased presence by major maritime powers throughout the waters
of the Indian Ocean, as well as the Gulf of Aden, could contribute to
the eradication of Somali piracy. In fact, the United States has
already developed a comprehensive policy of diplomatic and legal
279
action to fight piracy.
The American piracy policy "emphasizes
collaborative strategies by states and the maritime industry to prevent
pirate attacks and other criminal acts of violence." 280 Some scholars
believe that President Obama should "accelerate efforts to partner
with shipping states, regional coastal states, and major port states to
create a more effective international legal and enforcement
network. "281
Somali piracy has flourished because Somalia is a failed state,
unable to deal with this issue on any serious level and because most
regional powers in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have
underdeveloped law enforcement and criminal systems and few
282
resources to help Somalia.
Consequently, operational and
diplomatic partnering between Somalia, its regional partners, and the
world's most powerful maritime countries is crucial in order to create
a network of states interested in repressing and eradicating Somali
283
piracy.
If this law enforcement, judicial, and diplomatic partnering
does not take place, Somali pirates will continue to benefit from
murky jurisdictional issues and "the inherent isolation of vessels and
284
nations. " Maritime powers should focus their efforts on preventing
this unfortunate outcome.
3.

Cost sharing structure between governments and shipping companies
The efforts necessary to eliminate Somali piracy will entail great
285
financial costs.
Because governments of major maritime powers
279. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 44.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 22, at 57-58.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 57.
285. For example, several technological advances have contributed toward the
creation of weapons for combating piracy. Some of these advances include the
installation of electric fences on ships, the antipiracy life jacket, and satellite tracking
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may be reluctant to expend such vast sums of money on a relatively
286
isolated problem and because shipping companies suffer the largest
monetary losses in this situation, shipping companies should share
the financial burden of fighting piracy with the major maritime
countries and their governments.
Shipping companies could contribute specific amounts of money
each year to naval coalitions of piracy fighting countries. Such
resources could be used to purchase new navy ships, to equip navy
ships with powerful weapons, and to train navy personnel in combat
tactics. If shipping companies contributed significant amounts to
maritime powers' governments, those governments could more easily
justify the efforts in Somalia to their constituents by showing that the
monetary expenditure is relatively low in piracy-fighting operations
due to the shipping companies' donations. Shipping companies
could, in exchange, ask for more serious protection of their ships
sailing through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Instead of
paying high ransoms to the Somali pirates, thereby exacerbating the
287
piracy problem, shippers could give the same amount of money to
world powers and to their naval patrols and law enforcement
operations working against the Somali pirates.
A cost-sharing
structure could improve the likelihood of improved maritime
presence in Somalia by the world superpowers and could thereby
reduce the frequency of pirate attacks, saving shipping companies
considerable ransom costs.
CONCLUSION

The next step in fighting piracy requires a smarter approach to
counter-piracy operations, logistics, and the legal endgame. The
major shipping nations and regional states must develop agreements
to enable real-time coordination for dealing with detainees, sorting
out where they will be temporarily held, and deciding on the venue
c
.
288
J.Or prosecut10n.
Somali pirates are sea-terrorists and represent a global threat.
Likewise, any response to such a menace should be global. Major
devices such as ShipLoc. However, the high expenses associated with these
technological advances continue to impede the use of these antipiracy solutions.
Dahlvang, supra note 54, at 42-44.
286. Carbin, supra note 19, at 55 (noting that "[t]he leading trading nations are
evidently hesitant to take more direct measures" in the fight against Somali piracy).
287. See id. (noting that the international shipping community's willingness to pay
ransoms to Somali pirates ensures that "the practice will continue").
288. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 9, at 48.
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maritime powers should partner with countries in the regions where
piracy proliferates to establish law enforcement and jurisdictional
networks to ensure that pirates are apprehended as often as possible
and that those who are captured are always prosecuted. Counter
piracy cooperation involving information and data sharing and joint
maritime patrols off the Somali coast can increase the likelihood of
pirate capture. Jurisdictional agreements among maritime powers
and regional countries can increase the probability of prosecution,
making at least one criminal forum available for all captured pirates.
Finally, shipping companies themselves should contribute to the
global fight against piracy by contributing financially and logistically
to maritime countries already engaged in the process of eradicating
piracy. Such a comprehensive antipiracy operation on a global scale
is the only possible solution to the threat of Somali piracy.
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